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Article I of the Constitution begins: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress. .... -I The Supreme Court has
long found a limit in article I on Congress' power to delegate the
power of legislation to other branches of government - the so-called
delegation doctrine.2 Unchecked delegation would undercut the leg-
islature's accountability to the electorate and subject people to rule
through ad hoe commands rather than democratically considered gen-
eral laws.
3
The precise extent of the constitutional limit on delegation appears
to present a dilemma, however, since Congress clearly cannot be re-
quired to decide everything. The Court has sought to resolve this
seeming dilemma by permitting a statute to delegate legislative power
so long as it provides an "intelligible principle"4 to guide the delegate.
Since the early part of this century, the Court has said in essence that
a statute may be vague so long as it is either not too vague or no
vaguer than necessary. 5
This test itself is vague. It has allowed the interpretation of the
delegation doctrine to swing like a pendulum with the changing poli-
tics of the Court and the times. Into the early 1930s, the Court held
that fairly amorphous statutes provided meaningful standards.6 The
interpretation swung sharply away from broad delegation in 1935
when two decisions7 found violations of the delegation doctrine in a
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Article I goes on, of course, to involve the President in the legisla-
tive process through the presentment clause and veto power.
2. See, eg., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935);
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
1, 41-48 (1825).
3. See notes 86-133 infra and accompanying text. A delegate can and sometimes does pro-
mulgate general rules, while Congress sometimes does enact rules that are meant to apply to only
a few subjects. The equal protection, bill of attainder, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitu-
tion are not widely effective constraints on regulation that lacks generality. The delegation doc-
trine, although it does not directly address the problem of lack of generality, would indirectly
encourage regulation that is more general by requiring Congress to do the legislating.
4. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
5. See, eg., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1911); Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904). See also notes 24-54 infra and accompanying text.
6. See, eg., Federal Radio Commn. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 285
(1933) (upholding delegation to FRC to grant radio licenses "as public convenience, interest or
necessity requires"); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 401 (1928) (up-
holding so-called flexible tariff provision designed to "equalize. . . differences in costs of produc-
tion" between foreign nations and the United States); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,
507 (1911) (upholding delegation to Secretary of Interior under Forest Reserve Act to make rules
and regulations necessary "to improve and protect the forest. . . and to secure favorable condi-
tions of water flows" in national forests).
7. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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New Deal statute because it delegated in broader strokes than any-
thing that had come before8 and because some Justices opposed the
policy of that statute.9 Those two decisions helped to set in motion the
"court packing plan" and criticism that doctrinaire jurists were hob-
bling the efforts of President Roosevelt and Congress to save the na-
tion from the disaster of the Depression. New appointments and,
perhaps, some bowing to political pressure quickly brought the Court
back to a more permissive view of delegation. Although the Court
never disavowed its 1935 decisions and continued to articulate essen-
tially the same delegation test, it has never again held a statute uncon-
stitutional on the basis of the delegation doctrine.10
The "intelligible principle" test as so applied has allowed the legis-
lative branch to avoid hard choices. Congress can leave it to an
agency or other delegate to promulgate rules of private conduct in fur-
therance of congressional goals, even though there are conflicts among
the goals. A statute might, hypothetically, order an agency to issue air
8. The section of the National Industrial Recovery Act struck down in A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), authorized the President to establish "codes
of fair competition" for a virtually unlimited number of industries and trades. 295 U.S. at 521-
22. Justice Cardozo termed the statute "delegation running riot," amounting to a complete
transfer of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concur-
ring). Many commentators have cited the statute reviewed in Schechter as the broadest delega-
tion ever attempted, and one unlikely to be tried again. See, eg., 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 176 (2d ed. 1978); Recent Cases, 49 HARV. L. REv. 332, 333 (1935).
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), dealt, however, with a different section of the
NIRA. The delegation in this instance seemed more in line with legislation the Court had previ-
ously upheld. It authorized the President, through rules and regulations, to restrict the interstate
transportation of petroleum produced in excess of the amount permitted by state law. 293 U.S.
at 406-07. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Cardozo found that the statute's declared policy and
structure provided standards sufficient to support the delegation. 293 U.S. at 435 (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting). As with delegations the Court had previously found valid, the "hot oil" provisions
were such that "[d]iscretion [was] not unconfined and vagrant. It [was] canalized within banks
that ke[pt] it from overflowing." 293 U.S. at 440 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
Subsequent commentators have agreed with Cardozo. See, eg., 1 K. DAvis, supra, at 175;
Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power (pts. I & II), 47 COLUM. L. REV. 359 & 561,
573 (1947); Note, Rethinking the Nondelegation Doctrine, 62 B.U. L. REv. 257, 277 n.93 (1982).
9. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST 132 (1980); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A
Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1982); Jaffe, supra note 8, at 573.
10. The fate of the doctrine in the post-New Deal era prompted one commentator to note
that the "intelligible principle" test had become "all but a vestigal euphemism, virtually shorn of
practical meaning." Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the
Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 443, 446 (1977). The cases support the
observation. See, eg., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (upholding portions of the Home
Owners Loan Act of 1933 authorizing the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to prescribe regula-
tions and conditions for the liquidation of savings and loan associations); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (upholding Emergency Price Control Act authorizing the President to
appoint a Price Administrator to set maximum wartime prices "in the interest of the national
defense and security"); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 545 n.4 (1939) (up-
holding Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to fix




pollution rules that promote such goals as health protection and mini-
mization of the costs of pollution control. The delegation doctrine is
ritualistically invoked, but fails to check agency discretion or to ensure
electoral accountability for the rules promulgated.
Nonetheless it was long felt that there was no alternative if govern-
ment was to cope with war, economic downturns, and other tribula-
tions.' In theory, broad delegation is essential to efficient, speedy
pursuit of government's goals. Practice shows, however, that dele-
gates are often less capable than Congress of resolving the political
conflicts in an issue.12 Delegation can set in motion a protracted game
that frustrates statutory goals. For example, my own analysis of the
Clean Air Act suggests that government is sometimes less able to cope
with delegation than without it.13
The pendulum may again have begun to swing against broad dele-
gation. Commentators and judges have begun to recall the delegation
doctrine's fundamental purposes. 14 Some recent Supreme Court opin-
ions suggest a possible interest in reinvigoration of the doctrine.15 Ad-
ministrative agencies no longer have the reputation of being
panaceas.1 6 Voters have shown concern that Congress dispenses regu-
latory powers without recognizing the long term costs of achieving the
promised benefits.
Can the Supreme Court produce a better test of delegation? With-
out an adequate test, a court deciding whether to strike down a statute
is exercising legislative power that, as the delegation doctrine itself dic-
tates, only Congress may use. Is there a test that would provide a
coherent basis for judicial decision, or is delegation a matter of politics
11. Representative of much contemporary thinking is Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667 (1975). In this extensive article, Stewart begins
with the necessity of delegation as a credo and emphatically dismisses the delegation doctrine as
a central strategy in dealing with administrative discretion. Id. at 1672-73.
12. See Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress and Executive Policy-making: Notes on Three Doc-
trines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 58-59; Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal
Administration, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1183, 1190 (1973).
13. Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA
L. RE v. 740, 789-98 (1983).
14. See, eg., J. ELY, supra note 9, at 131-34; T. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-124,
298-305 (1969); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
15. See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 541 n.75 (1981); 452
U.S. at 543-48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980); 448 U.S. at 672-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating a delegation
of legislative power to a legislative body where the delegated power was not to be exercised in
accordance with full legislative procedures).
16. See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 217 (1974); THE CRISIS OF THE REGU-
LATORY COMMISSIONS (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970). See generally Jaffe, supra note 12; T. Low,
supra note 14, at 92-104, 302-05.
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and policy which the courts should avoid? These are the central con-
cerns of this Article.
I believe that the Court can do better. The dilemma of having to
choose between abandoning the delegation doctrine's vital purposes or
imposing all of the functions of government on Congress is only appar-
ent. What creates the appearance of a dilemma is a failure to recog-
nize that government involves executive and judicial as well as
legislative powers. The test of permissible delegation should look not
to what quantity of power a statute confers but to what kind - stat-
utes should be permitted to create an occasion for the exercise of exec-
utive or judicial power, but not to delegate legislative power. A statute
that creates occasion for the exercise of executive or judicial power
does not delegate in the root sense of the word, which involves the
giving away of one's own power to another. In regulating private con-
duct, for example, the statute must state the general rules of conduct,
but can leave the method of application of those rules to the executive
and judicial branches. In other words, the statute itself must speak to
what people cannot do; the statute may not merely recite regulatory
goals and leave it to an agency to promulgate the rules to achieve those
goals.
This approach would serve the doctrine's purposes yet be sensitive
to practicalities. Past delegation cases stretched words to find that
Congress had provided an intelligible principle in order to uphold stat-
utes critical to essential governmental functions such as national de-
fense. 17 This was often unnecessary because many of these statutes
authorized the exercise of executive or judicial powers rather than del-
egating legislative powers. 18 It was also unfortunate because it robbed
the delegation doctrine of content and intellectual respectability and
blunted its ability to curb flagrant delegations of legislative power. 19
The approach suggested in this Article would allow the Court to reach
the same result as in some prior decisions upholding statutes and yet
still provide a principled basis for striking down other statutes that fly
in the face of the delegation doctrine's purposes.
The distinction between legislative and other powers as the basis
for a test of delegation was put forth by Chief Justice Marshall in an
17. See, eg., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
18. See notes 203-67 infra and accompanying text.
19. Characteristic of this denigration of the delegation doctrine is the preference of Frank-
furter and Landis for modem governmental practicalities rather than "jejune abstractions."
Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior"
Federal Courts -A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010, 1013 n.h1 (1924).
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1825 decision.20 Marshall's opinion recognized that these categories
cannot be mechanically defined. 2' Subsequent delegation decisions
failed to follow this opinion for reasons unrelated to its approach to
delegation. 22 Marshall's approach may appear conceptualistic and
perhaps frightening to minds accustomed to broad delegation of legis-
lative power. As will be argued, however, it is appropriate while the
Court's current approach is unprincipled and political.
Part I of this Article demonstrates the need for a new approach to
the delegation doctrine. It shows that the Court has failed to articu-
late a coherent test of improper delegation and that the alternative
tests offered by commentators are not sufficient. Part II then sets forth
a proposed test of improper delegation. The basic principles of an ap-
proach prohibiting delegations of legislative power are outlined and
illustrated. This Article does not, however, attempt anything so grand
as to suggest a final definition of the doctrine or to pass broadly on the
validity of statutes. Such an encompassing analysis is made impossible
by the rich variety of statutory types and the importance of looking at
each statute in context. This Article attempts the humbler task of ar-
guing that the approach to delegation here proposed provides a doctri-
nal basis for case law development that is more coherent than the
Court's current approach. Finally, Part III asks whether the proposed
test constitutes a manageable and appropriate exercise of judicial
power.
I. THE NEED FOR A NEW TEST OF IMPROPER DELEGATION
Socrates: Then the man who embarks on the search for an art of
speaking must first of all make a methodical classification, and find a
distinguishing mark for each of the two kinds of words, those which in
popular usage are bound to be ambiguous and those which are not.
Phaedrus: The man who grasps that will have made a very fine discov-
ery, Socrates.
23
20. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
21. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). Judge Wright alludes to the
possibility of a similar approach to a delegation test in a review essay aptly titled Beyond Discre-
tionary Justice, but does not develop the idea. Wright, supra note 14, at 586 n.35. The Court's
decisions relying, sometimes only in passing, on the "inherent powers" of the Executive also hint
at such an approach. See, eg., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936); see also text at notes 213-16 infra. Cf. United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975) (upholding delegation to Indian tribe "pos-
sess[ing] independent authority over the subject matter").
22. Two commentators have suggested, for example, that Marshall's conception of federal-
ism elucidated in Wayman may have limited the decision's precedential utility. See S. BARBER,
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 72 (1975); Note,
supra note 8, at 270.
23. PLATO, PHAEDRUS & LETTERS VII AND VIII 77 (Penguin Books 1973).
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Just as one who would speak clearly must learn to distinguish clear
from unclear expressions in a methodical way, the judge who would
have only the legislature legislate must learn to distinguish proper leg-
islation from improper delegation in a way that is sufficiently coherent
to allow judgments of a judicial rather than a legislative nature.
A. The Supreme Court's Failure to State a Coherent Test
The Supreme Court has failed to articulate a coherent test to dis-
tinguish statutes that improperly delegate from those that do not. The
established test asks whether the statute decides major policy issues by
laying down an "intelligible principle" or setting "legislative stan-
dards." 24 A statute that does so is a valid and complete act of legisla-
tive power, even if it delegates the making of "subordinate rules."
'25
These rules are said merely to "fill up the details."'26 The language of
"intelligible principle" and related rubrics does sound as if the statute
might have to state rules of conduct;27 the cases sometimes say that
the statute must provide a "standard" 28 or a "rule of conduct. ' 29 But
the language of these cases is deceiving. It is clear in each instance
that what is meant by "intelligible principle, .... standard," or even
"rule of conduct" is not a rule of conduct but a more or less detailed
enumeration of goals, even if these announced goals conflict.30 Ac-
cordingly, Congress need state neither "subordinate" nor any other
rules so long as it says enough about the goals that should guide the
agency in promulgating the rules that will actually govern private
conduct.
24. Jaffe claims to see a difference between the "intelligible principle" test articulated in J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928), and the "legislative standards"
test derived from A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935), and
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935). Jaffe, supra note 8, at 569. See also Note,
supra note 8, at 275-79. But, as actually articulated by the Court, the difference is not at all so
clear.
25. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
26. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825). Chief Justice Marshall coined
this phrase in Wayman. It has been used in the context of the more modem approach to delega-
tion. Eg., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
27. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,424 (1944); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 421-22 (1935).
28. See, eg., United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935).
29. See, eg., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971)
(three-judge panel).
30. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 284 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-24, 427 (1944); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421-22
(1935); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Con-
nally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge panel).
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The test to determine how much Congress must say about its goals
and the extent to which it must say how conflicts between its goals are
to be resolved has not been articulated, except to the extent that Con-
gress may leave the "details" to the agency. But "[w]hat is a 'detail' is
a question of degree."'31 The cases do not indicate what distinguishes a
major issue from a detail. The Court's stated delegation doctrine thus
allows the delegation of some quantity of power to the delegate with-
out providing any yardstick with which to measure that limit. The
test of whether a statute is overly ambiguous is, thus, without sub-
stance and so no test at all of whether Congress has met its obligation.
Further incoherence is introduced by an exception to the general
doctrine that holds that a statute that lacks an "intelligible principle"
may nonetheless be upheld in cases of "necessity." '32 Necessity is evi-
dent when action must be taken while Congress is out of session or
more quickly than the legislative machinery can possibly move.
33
However, "necessity" has also been invoked to justify delegation of
decisions on the grounds that they are technical, complicated, or re-
quire frequent adjustment 34 even though Congress itself does some-
times decide just such questions.35 "Necessity" as used by the Court is
therefore a question of degree concerning the allocation of legislative
time, a matter as to which the Court has shown no inclination to state
standards.
36
It is not just the decisions of the 1920s and the 1940s that articu-
31. Jaffe, supra note 8, at 362.
32. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). See generally
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
33. [B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international rela-
tions, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information which cannot be
swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature, Congress - in giving
the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs - must of necessity paint with a
brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (emphasis added). Accord United States v. Curtiss-Wdght
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936). See also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516
(1911) ("In the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide general regulations
for these various and varying details of management.").
34. See, ag., Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1976)
(quoting American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
35. See, eg., note 299 infra.
36. In J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928), for example, the
Court affirmed that Congress could not delegate "legislative power" to the Executive, but con-
ceded that a certain amount of interbranch "co-ordination" was required to govern effectively.
276 U.S. at 406. In other words, some delegation is inevitable. However, the Court failed to
posit a meaningful constitutional test of such delegation posing as interbranch "co-ordination,"
noting only that "[i]n determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another
branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and
the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination. " 276 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added).
Such reasoning is plainly circular and unenlightening.
Delegation Doctrine
lated this incoherent test. Much the same test also appeared in the
1935 decisions striking down the New Deal legislation, Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan,37 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States.38 The same rubrics continue to appear in the recent opinions
that would reinvigorate the delegation doctrine.39 Although this wide
range of opinions employs the same words, the opinions differ in nu-
ance and differ widely in how they would apply the doctrine. The test
has become so ephemeral and elastic as to lose its meaning, 40 and "has
long been regarded as theoretically unsatisfactory."'4
1
If not well articulated, is the test at least consistently applied?
While the Court has seemed prepared to uphold almost any statute as
acceptable delegation, application has in fact not been uniform. The
Court has created and applied a more stringent test of improper dele-
gation to strike down statutes in special categories of cases. Kent v.
Dulles,42 construing a statute granting a broad discretion to deny pass-
ports, held that where "activities or enjoyment, natural and often nec-
essary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are
37. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
38. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Though Panama Refining and Schechter replaced the term "intelli-
gible principle" with "legislative standards," the test articulated by the Court was essentially the
same. Both decisions stressed that the Constitution limited delegations. However, both also
carefully pointed out, as had previous opinions, that such a limit would not impede the practical
realities of governing:
The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources
of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down
policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy
as declared by the legislature is to apply.
295 U.S. at 530; 293 U.S. at 421.
39. In the most recent call for the revitalization of the doctrine, Justice Rehnquist, echoing
the words of Justice Cardozo in Schechter, 295 U.S. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring), inveighed
against "uncanalized delegation of legislative power." Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He failed, how-
ever, to articulate a new, useful measure of such delegations, relying instead on the amorphous,
pliable version of the doctrine developed in Hampton and Panama Refining. 448 U.S. at 674-75.
Despite his apparent distaste for open-ended delegations, Justice Rehnquist, following the lead of
earlier decisions, declined to support a rigid constitutional test by concluding that an otherwise
invalid delegation will pass constitutional muster if it is "justifiable in light of the 'inherent neces-
sities' of the situation." 448 U.S. at 676 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
40. Indeed, while never explicitly repudiating the constitutional requirement for an "intelligi-
ble principle" or "legislative standards," the Court has been able to avoid it by alternately hold-
ing that broad delegations are permissible in long-regulated fields because courts have experience
and precedents to rely on, see, eg., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947), and also permis-
sible in virgin areas of regulation because it is impracticable to require Congress to set precise
standards where there is no experience at regulation, see, eg., FCC v. RCA Communications,
346 U.S. 86, 94-96 (1953). Cf. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968)
(holding that FCC had authority to regulate cable antennae television even though it did not
exist at the time FCC enabling legislation was enacted).
41. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGrIMACY 78 (1978).
42. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail
or dilute them."
'43
While one can surely agree that the ability to travel with a passport
should not hinge on administrative decisions unguided by any legis-
lated standard, one still wonders what else is entitled to this higher
level of protection against delegated power. Kent v. Dulles' formula of
"activities or enjoyments, natural and often necessary to the well-being
of an American citizen" could, on its face, include the ability to work,
to carry on a profession, or to operate a business, but such a wide
construction would subject most, if not all, regulatory legislation to
this more stringent standard. Kent v. Dulles did not identify the rights
to which the more stringent standard applies, and subsequent Court
opinions have not provided enlightenment on the question.
Commentators have generally understood Kent v. Dulles' more
stringent standard to apply to statutes involving "protected freedoms"
as opposed to statutes that regulate property.44 No opinion of the
Court has attempted to justify applying a looser standard of delegation
in the case of statutes that delegate the power to regulate property,45
and I will argue that there may well be no principled justification for
such a distinction.4
6
The Court's failure to articulate and justify its approach is all the
more apparent in cases where it has narrowed or struck down statutes
on vagueness and other due process grounds rather than delegation.
The invalidation of vague criminal statutes has been justified partly by
concern for notice to the would-be defendant, but also by concern
about the wide power delegated to unelected officials.47 In Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 48 the Court cited "due process" as the reason to con-
strue a statute narrowly and thereby strike down a Civil Service Com-
mission regulation making resident aliens ineligible for many federal
jobs.49 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that the Court was using
43. 357 U.S. at 129.
44. See, eg., B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 47-48 (1976). In a concurring opinion,
Justice Brennan wrote that "the numerous deficiencies connec.ad with vague legislative direc-
tives. . . are far more serious when liberty and the exercise of fundamental rights are at stake."
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Robd does attempt a justification. See notes
350-53 infra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 354-65 infra and accompanying text.
47. See, eg., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Papachristou v. City of Jackson.
vle, 405 U.S. 156, 168-70 (1972).
48. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
49. 426 U.S. at 116. The Court's due process concern was that since Congress was the body
that allowed the aliens to reside in the United States, it would be wrong for it to allow a lower




the phrase "due process" to obscure the application of a special stan-
dard as to delegation in that case, a charge which the Court did not
address.50
Whether or not a theory could be constructed to explain the
Court's behavior in delegation, vagueness, and related cases, the Court
itself has not articulated such a reasoned theory. The Court and many
of its members have avoided explication of the delegation doctrine and
the implicit definition of legislative power in recent decades. Not since
1948 has any opinion for the Court's majority even attempted to deal
in a substantial manner with the delegation doctrine.51 A number of
dissents and concurrences have forcefully argued one side or another
of delegation issues, 52 but the opinions for the Court have either
avoided the issue altogether or treated it only in passing.5 3 When an
opinion for the Court has relied on delegation grounds in recent years,
it has strained to frame the result in terms of statutory construction
rather than unconstitutionality, thereby avoiding the full-scale treat-
ment of the doctrine that a constitutional decision would require.
5 4
The Court's inattention to the delegation doctrine from the late
1940s through the 1960s is perhaps understandable because delegation
appeared to be a dead issue. The Court had not declared any statute
unconstitutional for improperly delegating power to a government
body since Panama Refining and Schechter. A leading commentator
flatly advised attorneys in 1958 that delegation claims were so far-
fetched that making them would discredit one's other claims.55 Jus-
50. 426 U.S. at 122 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 774-78 (1948).
52. See, eg., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 545-48 (1981) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,
91 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 271-87 (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 624-27 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in
part). For earlier discussions, see H.P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 603-08
(1939) (Roberts, J., dissenting); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 582-83 (1939)
(McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
53. See, eg., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 541 n.75 (1981) (dis-
missing the delegation issue in a footnote as a matter of statutory interpretation); Industrial
Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980) (favoring
narrow construction of statute to avoid delegation problems); California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 59 (1974) (noting only limited aspect of delegation issue but upholding it as "well
established"); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196-208 (1971) (failing to mention delega-
tion issue); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266-68 (1967) (invalidating statute on first
amendment rather than delegation grounds); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (failed
to mention delegation issue).
54. See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-
46 (1980); National Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341-43 (1974); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
55. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 75 (lst ed. 1958).
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tice Marshall wrote in 1974 that the doctrine "has been virtually aban-
doned by the Court for all practical purposes" except where personal
liberties are involved.
56
The lack of attention to delegation is also understandable in terms
of the relatively slight division that the subject generated within the
Court through the early 1960s. The Court acted with few if any dis-
sents on the delegation grounds when it struck down the statutes in
Panama Refining and Schechter57 and later when it upheld statutes
against challenges on delegation grounds.58 The leading experts on
administrative law, although concerned about vague statutory man-
dates, agreed that the answer was not in judicial invalidation of stat-
utes, and instead urged that Congress write better laws 59 or argued
that courts must force agencies that make rules to narrow their own
discretion as a substitute for legislative specificity 6° or worried that
perhaps nothing could be done.
61
More recent events, however, have made the Court's inattention to
its unsatisfactory doctrine less excusable. A growing number of Jus-
tices have voiced support for the application of the doctrine. Justices
Harlan, Douglas and Stewart cited the delegation doctrine in a dis-
senting opinion in the 1963 case of Arizona v. California.62 In 1974
Justice Douglas wrote an opinion for the Court in National Cable Tel-
evision Association v. United States 63 invoking delegation concerns to
narrow a statute that would otherwise allegedly delegate the power to
tax.64 Justice Marshall wrote in dissent that this was the first decision
56. Federal Power Commn. v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
57. The Schechter decision was unanimous with only Justice Cardozo, joined by Justice
Stone, filing a brief concurring opinion. 295 U.S. at 551-55. Cardozo was the lone dissenter in
Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 433-48. Significantly, he did not disagree with the Court's doctri-
nal assumptions, only with their application to the statute under review. See Note, supra note 8,
at 277 n.93.
58. See, eg., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (no dissents); American Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946) (no dissents); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (one
dissent on delegation issue); Federal Power Commn. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591
(1944) (one dissent); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (one
dissent). See generally Jaffe, supra note 8, at 577.
59. See H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BET-
TER DEFINIION OF STANDARDS 22, 163-73 (1962); Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1198.
60. See Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 725-30 (1969);
Leventhal, Principled Fairness and Regulatory Urgency, 25 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 66, 70-75
(1974).
61. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 1672-73.
62. 373 U.S. 546, 625-26 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
63. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
64. 415 U.S. at 342.
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that had relied upon Schechter since 1936.65 Finally, in 1981, in In-
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Insti-
tute66 five members of the Court voted to overturn an action taken
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Four of them reached
this result by, inter alia, narrowly interpreting the Act to avoid uncon-
stitutionally broad delegation. 67 The fifth, Justice Rehnquist, argued
that the portion of the Act should in fact be struck down as unconsti-
tutional,68 a position with which Chief Justice Burger evidently agreed
in a subsequent case.69 For the first time since Panama Refining and
Schechter, a majority of the court found delegation problems with a
regulatory statute.7
0
American Petroleum was apparently no aberration. In 1983, the
Court handed down Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha,71 which struck down the legislative veto provision in the im-
migration law on the theory that such provisions improperly delegate
legislative power because they allow legislative action without use of
the full legislative process involving both houses of Congress and the
President.72 This rationale, Justice White correctly observed, is incon-
sistent with the Court's usual practice in delegation cases, which is to
uphold law making outside the legislative process. 73 The majority at-
tempted to distinguish its prohibition against delegating full legislative
power to one or both houses of Congress from its willingness to up-
hold delegations to the executive or agencies, but was unconvincing.74
Professor Tribe has concluded that the most plausible explanation of
Chadha is as a transition to "a significant judicial tightening of the
65. 415 U.S. at 354 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
67. 448 U.S. at 645-46. The opinion also made the argument that Congress would not have
given the agency such broad powers without a clear statement. 448 U.S. at 645.
68. 448 U.S. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
69. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. This assessment excludes cases involving "protected freedoms" or personal rights. See
notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
71. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
72. 462 U.S. at 944-59. Senator DeConcini has proposed a constitutional amendment that
would allow acts of Congress containing legislative veto provisions to be passed, effectively over-
ruling Chadha. See S.J. Res. 135, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); see also DeConcini & Faucher,
The Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAmendment, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 29 (1984). Hearings
on the proposed amendment were begun by the Constitution Subcommittee on March 2, 1984.
See [1983-84 Transfer Binder] 1 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 20,542 (Nov. 21, 1984).
73. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 985-87 (White, J., dissenting).
74. The majority argued that the agency was subject to judicial review to ensure compliance
with a statute, citing Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944). Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953
n.16. However, this argument based on judicial review requires courts to act as legislators. See
notes 89-116 infra and accompanying text.
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limits within which Congress may entrust anyone with lawmaking
power."
'75
Advocating the use of the delegation doctrine can, moreover,
hardly be thought the exclusive domain of the reactionary or the doc-
trinaire. Thinkers as diverse as Skelly Wright,76 John Ely,77 William
Douglas, 78 and James Freedman79 have expressed interest in its revi-
val.80 Most recently, Professors Peter Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and
Glen Robinson called for the renewal of the doctrine in an article that
concluded that "the idea of a change in constitutional rules governing
legislative delegations has acquired a fresh dignity." 81
Those who would reinvigorate the doctrine risk the charge of being
result-oriented unless they can provide a test with logical coherence,
substance, and constitutional underpinning. Some Justices express
concern about economic regulation statutes that delegate broadly but
seem not to be bothered by statutes that permit executive officials
broad scope to arrest people for "contemptuous" use of the American
flag82 or deny jobs to resident aliens.83 Other Justices have exactly the
opposite set of concerns.84 Indeed, the dissenters in American Petro-
75. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGiS. 1, 17 (1984) (emphasis in original).
76. See Wright, supra note 14, at 582.
77. See J. ELY, supra note 9, at 131-34.
78. See W. DOUGLAS, supra note 16, at 217.
79. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 41, at 78-94.
80. For other calls for a renewed delegation doctrine, see T. Lowi, supra note 14, at 297-303;
Koslow, Standardless Administrative Adjudication, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 407 (1970); Note, supra
note 8, at 314-20.
81. Aranson, Gelhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 67 (emphasis omitted).
82. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
83. Compare American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 545-48 (1981) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting), and Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980), with Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 122 (1976) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting), and Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 591-604 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
In American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 676-82, Justice Rehnquist forcefully argued that the term "to
the extent feasible" was a constitutionally inadequate standard for administrative implementa-
tion of occupational health and safety rules. Yet, he found no delegation problems with the Civil
Service Commission's rule barring the federal employment of noncitizens even though the en-
abling statfite contained no hint of a standard by which to assess such a rule. See Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. at 122-23. Justice Rehnquist was similarly unconcerned about the broad delega-
tion of enforcement discretion at issue in Goguen. 415 U.S. at 591-604 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
84. Justices Marshall and Brennan have advocated a more vigorous application of the delega-
tion doctrine to statutes "creating 'the danger of overbroad, unauthorized and arbitrary applica-
tion of criminal sanctions in an area of [constitutionally] protected freedoms.'" Federal Power
Commn. v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quot-
ing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 272 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring) (language altered
in original)). See also Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2430-33 (1984) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (deploring the unfettered discretion accorded family court
judges in finding the "serious risk" of future criminal behavior that permits pretrial detention of
juveniles); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 271-87 (1971) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas
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leum objected that the delegation involved was in line with those that
the Court had previously upheld and that the delegation doctrine was
being used as a pretext to mask policy objections to the Act.85 How-
ever, the dissenters, who set out to defend the practices of the Court
from the late 1930s through the recent past, also are open to charges of
pursuing a result-oriented, unprincipled jurisprudence; the incoher-
ence of the "intelligible principle" test and the Court's invocation of a
tougher test of improper delegation for some cases produces results
but not principles.
B. The Supreme Court's Failure to Fulfill the Doctrine's Purposes
Despite the inadequacy of what the Court says about delegation, it
nonetheless asserts that what it does in practice fulfills the doctrine's
purposes.86 The Court is wrong. As Justice Harlan stated:
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (deploring lack of standards for jury's decision to sentence prisoner
to death as a violation of delegation doctrine).
They have, however, found considerably fewer delegation problems in statutes regulating eco-
nornic interests. In American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 717-18 n.30, Justice Marshall, in a dissent-
ing opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Blackmun, explicitly rejected Justice
Rehnquist's position that the Occupational Safety and Health Act unconstitutionally delegated
authority to the enforcement agency: "I am frankly puzzled as to why the [delegation] issue is
thought to be of any relevance here.". Justice Marshall concluded that "Congress ha[d] made
'the critical policy decisions'" Justice Rehnquist found lacking. 448 U.S. at 717-18. Similarly,
Justices Marshall and Brennan found no delegation problems with the "fees" imposed by the
FCC under the statute the majority narrowed by construction because of delegation concerns in
National Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 352-54 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. See 448 U.S. 607, 717-18 n.30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Nathanson, Separation
of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent"Agen-
cies, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1064, 1065-74 (1981).
86. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-26 (1944); see also Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge panel).
The use of delegation to strike down New Deal legislation in 1935, despite upholding amor-
phous statutes before and afterwards, gave rise to the suspicion that the doctrine was no more
than a pretext invoked by courts to repeal legislation that they disliked. See Jaffe, supra note 8, at
573-74. See also National Cable Television Assn. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 360 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority occupied itself with purported delegation
infirmities in order to narrow a statute it disfavored despite contrary legislative history). As
Dean Ely has noted, the delegation doctrine has long been viewed as a device for striking down
disfavored legislation, perhaps because of its contemporaneous use with the Court's substantive
due process flirtations and its restrictive interpretation of the commerce power. J. ELY, supra
note 9, at 132. He concluded, however, that this is "a case of death by association." Id. at 133.
Whatever the 1935 Court's motives, the doctrine was and is more than an artifact of the
confrontation between the Court and the New Deal Administration. Many opinions from the
early 1800s through 1935 stated a limit on delegation. See, e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 421 (1935) ("The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to
others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested."); J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) ("[I]t is a breach of the National fundamental law
if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial
branch .... "); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legisla-
tive power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."); Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) ("It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the
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The principle. . serves two primary functions vital to preserving the
separation of powers required by the Constitution. First, it insures that
the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an
appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the people.
Second, it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an exercise at
large by providing the courts with some measure against which to judge
the official action that has been challenged. 87
Each of these two purposes - accountability and judicial review -
has been prominently discussed in the delegation case law and
literature. 88
Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative."). These
early statements seem an empty formality because they so often upheld amorphous legislation
through artificial reasoning. This may have more to do with the legal style of the early part of
the century than lack of real concern about the breadth of delegation. See generally A. SUTHER-
LAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD 174-75 (1967). It is necessary to point out artifice in legal rea-
soning, but better still to try "to appreciate the latent wisdom in many a prejudice and fiction."
Kessler, Arthur Linton Corbin - A Tribute, 64 YALE L.J. 164, 164 (1954).
It is often written that no statute fell on delegation grounds until 1935. See, e.g., Immigration
& Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 51, 62 (1965); Jacoby, Delegation of Powers
and Judicial Review: A Study in Comparative Law, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 871, 871-72 (1936);
McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. RV. 1119, 1127
(1977); Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 826 n.458; Note, supra note 8, at 275-76. At least one
earlier case, however, United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921), cited delega-
tion concerns in the course of striking down a statute. The decision most prominently cited the
fifth and sixth amendments, but delegation concerns were integral to the Court's reasoning. See
255 U.S. at 87, 92. Only one of the Court's major delegation opinions has cited Cohen Grocery in
a delegation context. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947).
Whatever the early case law, leading jurists took the delegation doctrine seriously. Professor
Freund wrote in 1928 that delegation is proper only "where there are no controverted issues of
policy or of opinion." E. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY
218 (1928). The architects of the Rules Enabling Act, including Chief Justice Taft, were signifi-
cantly concerned about improper delegation in drafting the Act's language. See Burbank, The
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1073-75, 1106-07 (1982).
87. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis
in original) (footnote omitted).
88. Only recently have opinions explicitly appealed to accountability as a fundamental pur-
pose of the doctrine. See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 272
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Previously, the Court implicitly invoked accountability concerns by reference to the
separation of powers and its underlying rationale. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825). Numerous commentators have emphasized accountability in their calls
for the doctrine's reinvigoration. See, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 8, at 359; Schwartz, supra note 10, at
445; Wright, supra note 14, at 583-85.
Judicial review has been a primary concern of the Court in delegation cases since 1944. See
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944). See also American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 686
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Robel, 389 U.S. at 275 (Brennan, J., concurring); Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 106 (1946); Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge panel).
For commentaries on the relationship between judicial review and the delegation doctrine, see
Leventhal, supra note 60, at 67-71; McGowan, supra note 86, at 1123-30; Wright, supra note 14,
at 580-82; Note, supra note 8, at 269-96.
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1. Judicial Review
The Supreme Court cases try to overcome the lack of a criterion to
differentiate major issues from "details" by restating the question in
terms of whether the statute provides an adequate basis for judicial
review. 89 The statute is valid if it "sufficiently marks the field within
which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known by a review-
ing court whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legisla-
tive will." 90 A statute that fails to make key choices reflects little in
the way of legislative will and so will allow a wide range of "lawful"
agency activity. For delegation not to undercut judicial review, the
Court must require statutes to make the important policy choices -
that is, require Congress to exercise the legislative power itself.
The Court has nonetheless long upheld statutes that authorize offi-
cials to promulgate rules of conduct, where the chief statutory con-
straint on those rules is the admonition to achieve a multiplicity of
conflicting policy goals without instructions about how the conflicts in
goals are to be reconciled. 91 Such statutes leave the pivotal policy
choices to administrators because the legislation expresses generalized
wishes without making the hard choices which the Constitution as-
signs to Congress.
Even if the statute provides that the goals shall be balanced, it will
seldom tell how the balancing is to be done. Do such statutes set the
stage for meaningful judicial review of the agency's choice of priorities
among competing policy goals? So long as the agency follows statu-
tory procedures, gives lip service to each goal and cloaks its decision
with a modicum of rationality, the agency will be permitted wide lati-
tude in assigning the relative weight that each goal should get.92 The
statute provides no standard against which to measure the agency's
89. See, eg., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge panel). See generally L.
JAFFE, supra note 86, at 70-71; Note, supra note 8, at 281.
90. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
91. Indeed, the Court has explicitly found that such statutes fulfill Congress' legislative
function:
The fact that Congress accepts the administrative judgment as to the relative weights to be
given to these [conflicting] factors in each case when that judgment in other respects is
arrived at in the manner prescribed by the statute, instead of attempting the impossible by
prescribing their relative weight in advance for all cases, is no more an abandonment of the
legislative function than when Congress accepts and acts legislatively upon the advice of
experts as to social or economic conditions without reexamining for itself the data upon
which that advice is based.
Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 145-46 (1941). Thus, not only is Congress able
to delegate the resolution of policy conflicts to an administrative agency, the latter is free to alter
its resolution with "each case." See notes 111-14 infra and accompanying text.
92. See, eg., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971).
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weighing of the goals but rather assigns that task to the agency. It is
hard for the court to supervise the agency's choice without intruding
upon the agency's policy-making province.93 For courts to assume the
weighing of goals is no solution at all. In effect, this approach treats
the problem of delegation to the agency by turning it into a delegation
to the courts.
Judge Harold Leventhal argued that the courts could provide
meaningful judicial review without intruding upon the agency's pol-
icy-making role:
Congress has been willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly -
and courts have upheld such delegation - because there is court review
to assure that the agency exercises the delegated power within statutory
limits, and that it fleshes out objectives within those limits by an admin-
istration that is not irrational or discriminatory. Nor is that envisioned
judicial role ephemeral, as [Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe]
makes clear.
94
Judge Leventhal overstates the extent to which judicial review con-
trols administrative discretion in most cases. Overton Park95 is an ex-
ception because the Court was able to construe the statute to give the
delegate very little discretion to weigh conflicting goals. It involved
the Secretary of Transportation's approval of the placement of a fed-
eral highway through a park under a statute that pursued the conflict-
ing goals of park preservation and economy in highway construction.
As Judge Leventhal noted, the normal grounds for reversal would be
limited to the Secretary's exceeding statutory limits or exercising dis-
cretion within those limits irrationally or discriminatorily. The Court
reversed the Secretary by construing the statute to make the goal of
park preservation paramount: "the very existence of the statutes indi-
cates that protection of parkland was to be given paramount impor-
tance. . . .[i]f the statutes are to have any meaning."196 The Court
did not consider the possibility that the Congress intended to avoid a
choice between the conflicting goals - that it intended to punt -
93. See, eg., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519 (1978). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 449-52, 454-59 (1944) (Rob-
erts, J., dissenting); H.P. Hood & Sons v. United States, 307 U.S. 588, 605-07 (1939) (Roberts, 1,
dissenting); Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 33-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Koslow, supra note 80, at 407; McGowan, supra
note 86, at 1125-26; Stewart, supra note 11, at 1696-97. But see Rodgers, A Hard Look at Ver-
mont Yankee: Environmental Law under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699 (1979).
94. Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en
banc) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). See also Rodgers, JudicialReview
of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11
ENVTL. L. 301, 317 (1981).
95. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
96. 401 U.S. at 412-13 (footnote omitted).
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although at least one careful analysis of the statute argues that, when
enacted, "the statutory language was understood as an ambiguous
compromise between highway advocates and environmentalists.
97
Had the Court not read the statute to so confine the Secretary's discre-
tion, the Court, in order to reverse, would have had to find that the
Secretary had exercised that discretion irrationally or discriminatorily.
Under this test, the Secretary would have been left with great latitude
because there are usually many ways to balance conflicting goals that
are neither irrational nor discriminatory as those words are used in
defining the standard of judicial review. 98
The Court cannot apply its approach to Overton Park widely be-
cause most policy areas demand a balancing of goals rather than mak-
ing one of the goals paramount. It is the statutes that leave an
administrative agency to reconcile conflicting goals that raise delega-
tion concerns. In such cases judicial review is least potent.
Courts have looked to administratively created standards to put
meaning into such statutory schemes and thereby into judicial review.
The Supreme Court used such an approach in the 1944 Yakus deci-
sion.99 Professor Davis developed and extended it in his writings,100
and Judge Leventhal relied on Yakus and Professor Davis in the lead-
ing modern case, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally. 101 The Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 1970 at issue in Amalgamated Meat Cutters
authorized the President "to issue such orders and regulations as he
may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and sala-
ries." 10 2 The goals were to reduce inflation while avoiding the inequi-
ties, shortages, and other problems usually generated by price
controls. 103 The Act was a classic case of Congress leaving it to the
delegate to balance conflicting goals. As Judge Leventhal wrote:
"Congress was acting in a setting where all were agreed on the need to
control inflation but opinion was sharply divided on the optimum
measures for the Government to use." 104 Judge Leventhal did try to
point to an instance where the 1970 Act was "precise in its limita-
97. R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 679 (1978) (footnote
omitted).
98. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 1676-88.
99. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944); see also Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245 (1947).
100. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 206-16; Davis, supra note 60, at 725-30; see also Jaffe,
supra note 8, at 580.
101. 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). Judge Leventhal, a circuit judge on the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, was sitting by designation on a three-judge district court panel.
102. 337 F. Supp. at 764.
103. 337 F. Supp. at 749-52; see also 337 F. Supp. at 764-72 (selected legislative history).
104. 337 F. Supp. at 750.
1241April 1985]
1242 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:1223
tions"105 on the Executive's power, but noted in an article published
after the opinion that this instance was "academic."'1 0 6 He ultimately
sought to find the standards that would set the stage for judicial review
in administrative practice - both the "common lore"10 7 of price con-
trol policy developed in wartime and the standards that the President
was expected to promulgate under the 1970 Act.108 But, as Judge
Leventhal himself noted, the Executive is not bound by action under
earlier statutes 09 and can amend the rules that it adopts under the
current law. It is true that such amendments would be subject to judi-
cial review, but it is far easier for an administrator to change the way
discretion is exercised than the way that a statute is interpreted. 110
The Court has made clear in two recent cases that an agency has
considerable scope to change the policy that it adopts under delegated
power. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co. 1 I overturned a change in policy, but
stated that a court must allow a change if it is rationally related to the
goals of the statute,1 12 a test that an agency can ordinarily satisfy.
Subsequently, Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council
affirmed an agency's change of poicy.1 13 The Court stated that "an
agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities
105. 337 F. Supp. at 747.
106. Leventhal, supra note 60, at 68.
107. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 748.
108. See 337 F. Supp. at 756-59.
109. See 337 F. Supp. at 748.
110. See notes 270-73 infra and accompanying text.
111. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
112. See 463 U.S. at 42-44. The Agency, during the Carter Administration, had issued a rule
requiring auto manufacturers to install passive safety devices such as air bags or automatic
seatbelts. The Agency later effectively repealed the rule, apparently because of the Reagan Ad-
ministration's different priorities. 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part). The Agency,
however, gave other reasons for its action: it said that manufacturers would install automatic
seatbelts instead of air bags and that the public would disarm the automatic seatbelts. 463 U.S.
at 38-39. The Court reversed the Agency's action. Nonetheless, the case illustrates just how
tenuous judicial control of Agency priorities is. The Court made clear that the Agency could
amend its rules for any reason rationally related to the act's goals. 463 U.S. at 46-48. It also
made clear that it was the Agency's province to weigh the act's competing goals in making
amendments. 463 U.S. at 51-57. Indeed, under previous administrations, the Agency had fre-
quently amended the rules, reflecting a wide range of possible rules. 463 U.S. at 34-38. The
Reagan Administration's amendment might well have passed judicial review if the Agency had
done a better job of lawyering. The first stated ground for reversal was that the Agency gave no
reason whatsoever for not requiring manufacturers to install airbags in all cars, even though the
auto manufacturers had arguments as to why such a requirement would not be feasible. 463 U.S.
at 46-50.
Some of the Court's dicta could be read as creating a strong presumption of validity for
existing regulations, but Professor Smythe argues persuasively that it would be a mistake to use
the dicta in this way. Smythe, Judicial Review of Rule Recission, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1928,
1934-35 (1984). The Supreme Court, moreover, has not done so. See text at notes 113-14 infra.
113. 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
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may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the in-
cumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judg-
ments." 1 14 In short, previously announced agency rules control future
agency action only to a limited degree and do not shield those rules
from shifts in the political winds.
Judge Leventhal's notion that the judicial review makes Congress
"willing to delegate its legislative powers broadly" 115 suggests that
Congress is giving up its own power out of generous concern for the
public's good. Often, however, Congress is simply anxious to avoid
responsibility' 16 and is giving away not something of its own, but
rather the public's right to hold its representatives accountable. Once
sacrificed, this right cannot be retrieved through the exercise of judi-
cial review.
2. Accountability
Legislators are classically understood to be held accountable by
standing for reelection based upon their votes on legislation. The ap-
proach to delegation developed in Yakus"1 7 and Amalgamated Meat
Cutters"18 as well as in Professor Davis' writing 19 clashes with this
notion of accountability because the legislature could let the delegate
choose, in the first instance, how to balance conflicting goals. As John
Ely said:
[T]he common case of nonaccountability involves not a situation where
the legislature has drawn a distinction whose range of [goals] won't be
readily apparent, but rather a situation where the legislature (in large
measure precisely in order to escape accountability) has refused to draw
the legally operative distinctions, leaving that chore to others who are
not politically accountable.'
20
Among those who would uphold statutes that establish goals and
leave administrators to establish rules, there are two views as to ac-
countability. Professor Davis seems ready to jettison accountability as
114. 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
115. Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
116. See Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, 40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 1, 25-31 (discussing the Economic Stabilization
Act, which was at issue in Amalgamated Meat Cutters); Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 756-66
(discussing the Clean Air Act, which was at issue in Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)).
117. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,426 (1944). See also Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245 (1947).
118. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-
judge panel). See text at notes 101-10 supra.
119. See 1 K. DAViS, supra note 8, at 206-16.
120. J. ELY, supra note 9, at 130-31.
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one of the delegation doctrine's fundamental purposes and to direct all
energies to the control of administrative discretion. 121 The other view
is that accountability is still maintained. The notion, articulated by
the Court in Yakus 122 and by Judge Leventhal in Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 123 among others,' 24 is that courts will force administrators to
articulate administrative standards through regulations that will then
be subjected to legislative scrutiny, and which the legislature can re-
verse by amending the statutes or bringing pressure to bear in over-
sight hearings or the appropriation process. In this view, we should
not be tied to classical notions of accountability, based upon legisla-
tures expressing choices in authorizing legislation, but rather should
look more broadly at the accountability produced by the legislative-
administrative-judicial system as a whole. 125
This argument raises two troublesome questions: first, whether as
a matter of fact, the new approach provides equivalent accountability
and, second and more importantly, whether as a matter of theory it is
compatiblewith the constitutional text.
As for the factual question, there are certain obvious differences
from the classical model. Congress is not initiating the law-making
process, subject to a possible presidential veto, but asking the executive
branch or independent agencies to make rules subject to formal or de
facto legislative veto. The veto may occur through an amendment to
the statute or informal pressure from a congressional committee or
even an influential member of Congress. In the classical model, law
can be made only by congressional action. In the alternative model,
administratively promulgated law can be sustained by congressional
inaction or modified by informal action by a committee or individual
member. Thus, under the alternative model, controversial choices can
be made without votes being taken and responsibility being publicly
assumed by members of Congress. The making of choices becomes
less visible and responsibility more attenuated. Without idealizing ac-
countability under the classical model, it is safe to say that the alterna-
tive model makes matters worse. Citizens interested in how their
representative has acted on hard issues cannot necessarily get the an-
swer from voting records, but instead must search out what happened
121. See Davis, supra note 60, at 713.
122. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-27 (1944).
123. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 759 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-
judge panel).
124. Eg., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 271-87 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See note 100 supra. See also Jaffe, supra note 8, at 360; Stewart, supra note 11, at 1672-
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administratively under delegations that the legislature authorized.
Even if members of the public could and would penetrate the complex-
ity and stultifying aridity of the Federal Register and other agency
publications, the member can deny responsibility by claiming personal
disagreement with what was done.
In addition, there are a number of practical barriers to the fresh
reexamination of delegated issues once the administrative process has
begun to chew upon them. Agencies delegated issues too hot for Con-
gress to handle often have even less political capacity than Congress to
make the necessary choices. 126 The hope that administrative action
will crystallize an issue for subsequent legislative action may prove
unavailing because the agency has also attempted to avoid the issue or
to resolve it at a low level of visibility.127 Even if there is some admin-
istrative action, Congress may fail to disapprove it even if most mem-
bers would be so inclined because of the considerable inertia in the
legislative process.
128
Legislative inertia is made the more binding by what some political
scientists call the "iron triangle,"' 129 composed of the agency, congres-
sional committee staffs, and interest-group lobbyists. The iron triangle
represents the most powerful forces at work in the administrative pro-
cess, those with unique access to information and ability to control the
decision-making agenda. The result of that process is likely to have
something to offer to the institutional interests of each side of the tri-
angle and each is likely to begin to count on that administrative result
in making plans for the future. The iron triangle tends to resist legisla-
tive revisions that serve broader public interests.
More significant than whether the alternative model can provide
some substitute form of accountability, however, is whether any such
substitute is compatible with the framers' plan expressed in the Consti-
tution. It was just such an incompatibility that underlay the Court's
rejection in Chadha 30 of the argument that the legislative veto was
superior to the alternatives on grounds of practicality and accountabil-
ity. 13 1 The Court stated in Chadha that "[tlo allow Congress to evade
the strictures of the Constitution and in effect enact Executive propos-
126. See Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1188-91.
127. See Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 766-76.
128. See Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 116, at 16-17.
129. See, eg., Herbers, Government Power Poised for a Grand Realignment, N.Y. Times,
June 26, 1983, § 4, at 1, col. 4.
130. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
131. 462 U.S. at 958-59. Such an analysis would also effectively undercut the extreme posi-
tion as to accountability taken by Professor Davis. See text at note 121 supra.
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als into law by mere silence cannot be squared with Art. I. '132
The exercise of the legislative power thus requires affirmative ac-
tion on the part of Congress. The Court's current approach purports
to square agency lawmaking with accountability by asserting that
Congress had a chance to object, but remained silent. Under Chadha,
this is an impermissible breach of article I because it undermines the
electoral accountability which the Constitution places on Congress as
a protection of the people against their government. Even if the alter-
native model may provide some means of accountability and even if it
is more practical than that set out in the Constitution, it is not for the
legislature or the courts to ignore the constitutional command for the
sake of convenience.
There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of [the Supreme]
Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often en-
countered in complying with explicit constitutional standards may be
avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. . . . With all the
obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not
yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise
of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution. 133
The Court's current application of the delegation doctrine, by way
of an amorphous and ultimately meaningless definition of legislative
power, undercuts the accountability the Constitution seeks to protect.
C. The Lack of a Sufficient Alternative to the Court's Delegation
Test
The opinions in American Petroleum that invoke delegation do lit-
tle more than cite old rubrics. 134 Judge Wright calls for a case-by-case
approach while frankly admitting that he is not sure what principles
would guide the case law. 135 Dean Ely calls for a return to Panama
Refining and Schechter without recognizing the deficiencies in doctrine
that they share with the rest of the case law. 136 Some commentators
have tried to state a standard for the quantity of power that might be
delegated but have only embellished the existing test. 137
132. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958 n.22.
133. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
134. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646
(opinion of the Court), 672-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), 717-18 n.30 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(1980). See also note 39 supra.
135. See Wright, supra note 14, at 586-87.
136. See J. ELY, supra note 9, at 131-34; see also T. Lowi, supra note 14, at 300-01.
137. See, eg., Merrill, Standards - A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47
NEB. L. REv. 469, 473 (1968) (proposes employment of "doctrine of standards" which amounts
only to description of current judicial rhetoric); Note, supra note 8, at 314-20 (proposes a review-
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There have been, however, major efforts to state a test of delega-
tion in fundamentally new terms by Davis,138 Barber, 139 and Freed-
man. 4° Professor Davis suggests that the Court look not just at the
standards in the statute but also at the regulations and procedures of
the agency to see whether the situation as a whole adequately limits
the discretion of the delegates.' 4 ' Davis' proposal explicitly seeks to
control prosecutorial discretion,142 which has previously not been an
object of the delegation doctrine. Whether or not that has merit, his
scheme, as pointed out above, does not serve the purposes of the dele-
gation doctrine.
143
Professor Barber writes, "let us ask whether Congress has author-
ized rule making by others out of irresolution and in order to evade its
responsibilities or as a means to exercising its power of choice among
competing policies."' 44 At this level of generalization, Barber is not
providing a test but rather stating some plausible objectives that a test
should try to achieve. Barber would have courts look at the legislative
history to "seek statements of the salient issues at the time of enact-
ment in order to determine whether the statutory standards express a
clear choice between the alternatives Congress faced."' 145 Barber's test
would require courts to distinguish "salient" from nonsalient issues.
This distinction differs only in terminology from the unclear distinc-
tion under the "intelligible principle" test between major issues and
details. Barber's test does require courts to define "legislative power"
in order to decide whether Congress has failed to exercise that power
or rather authorized another branch to do so on its behalf. That is the
inquiry at the core of the test that I propose.146 Finally, Barber's test
would require the courts to decide whether Congress failed to decide
between alternatives because it was evading responsibility or because it
believed that another branch would be better placed to make it. He
ability test that is meaningless for the reasons stated at notes 24-31 supra and accompanying
text).
138. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 206-16; see also Davis, supra note 60, at 725-30.
139. See S. BARBER, supra note 22, at 36-51.
140. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 41, at 78-94; see also Freedman, Delegation of Power and
Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 307 (1976).
141. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 206-16. In many ways Davis' approach is an extension,
albeit more forceful and explicit, of the Court's emphasis on judicial reviewability of administra-
tive actions as a means of containing otherwise overbroad delegations. See, eg., Fahey v. Mallo-
nee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
142. See 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 8, at 213-15.
143. See notes 99-116 supra and accompanying text.
144. S. BARBER, supra note 22, at 41.
145. Id. at 44.
146. See Part II infra.
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does not adequately explain how courts might go about divining some-
thing so subjective as legislative motive. 147
Professor Freedman suggests that the quantity of power that may
be delegated should vary with the type of power that Congress is exer-
cising. 148 For instance, he sees greater need to limit delegation when
Congress acts pursuant to its impeachment or taxing powers than its
commerce power. 149 Freedman does not, however, say what test of
delegation should be applied when Congress regulates or exercises
other workaday powers, except to indicate that delegation should be
more closely scrutinized when done under some clauses of the Consti-
tution than others. Still, Professor Freedman has taken an important
step - a step away from the quantitative approach of the "intelligible
principle" test, which asks whether Congress has said enough about its
goals and resolved the conflicts that are important enough to require
"legislative" action.
This Article suggests a test of delegation geared to the quality of
power conferred upon the Executive rather than its quantity. By the
quality of power I am not referring, as is Freedman, to the clause of
the Constitution pursuant to which Congress legislates but rather to
the type of power that the Executive would exercise. Legislation
under the commerce clause, for instance, might give the Executive the
power to establish rules of conduct or the power to interpret them.
The former would, for me, constitute legislative power; the latter
would not.
Professors Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson call for constraints
upon "delegating legislative authority,"1 50 with the emphasis in the
original. The purpose of their valuable article was not to provide a test
of improper delegation and they do not say how they would distin-
guish legislative from other powers. It is this delicate problem that
147. Barber does purport to deal with the motive issue, S. BARBER, supra note 22, at 47, but
his discussion focuses on the propriety of courts using legislative history along with the actual
text of statutes to aid in interpretation. The courts have sometimes held legislation unconstitu-
tional where improper motives were patent, such as the recent case dealing with a New Jersey
statute that sought to avoid the prohibition on school prayer by requiring a period for silent
reflection. See May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983). However, motives are
likely to be less clear in the regulatory area, especially if the Court should happen to adopt
Barber's test and so give Congress an incentive to indulge in vague generalizations or disingenu-
ousness on the issue of motive. It is useful here to distinguish between motive and purpose. The
motive behind a congressional action is the subjective individual considerations which induced
the legislature to adopt a statute. These may be and usually are multifarious and difficult to
ascertain. The purpose of a statute is the regulatory goals it seeks to achieve. These are likely to
be evident from the statute itself though they may conflict.
148. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 41, at 85-88.
149. Id.
150. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 65 (emphasis in original).
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this Article addresses. 151
II. A PROPOSED TEST OF IMPROPER DELEGATION
A. The Qualitative Approach
Supreme Court cases from much of the nineteenth century 152 and
into the first decades of the twentieth 53 held that Congress may not
delegate "legislative Powers." This would seem to comport with the
plain language of the Constitution, which provides in article I, section
1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives."' 154 At least since the 1932 case of Norwegian Nitro-
gen Co. v. United States, '55 however, the Court has said that Congress
may delegate "legislative Powers" within limits. Panama Refining, 1
56
Schechter, 157 and the recent opinions of Justice Rehnquist15 8 also state
that delegation of legislative powers is limited but not prohibited.
Modem commentators make fun of the early cases that purported
to forbid delegation of any legislative power. 59 As Professor Jaffe put
it, "every statute is a delegation of lawmaking power to the agency
151. As this Article was being edited for publication, Professors Wallace Rudolph and Janet
Rudolph published an article that also bottoms the delegation doctrine on the concept of legisla-
tive power. Rudolph & Rudolph, Free Government and the Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Legis-
lative Power, 19 NEw ENG. L. REv. 551 (1984). However, their concept of "legislative power"
embraces the troublesome "intelligible principle" test. They distinguish, as I do, between stat-
utes that authorize regulation of conduct and statutes that authorize the management of public
property and the conduct of foreign affairs, but they see the Court as having adhered to these
distinctions. Id. at 563-69. In my view, however, the Court has overlooked these distinctions
frequently. See Part II. B. infra.
152. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."); Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825) ("It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the
Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.").
153. See, e.g., United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932)
("That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear."). See generally
1 K. DAVIs, supra note 8, at 150-51; Note, supra note 8, at 261-66.
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
155. 288 U.S. 294, 305 (1933) ("What is done by ... the President ... is in substance a
delegation, though a permissible one, of the legislative process."). See also Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) ("Delegation by Congress has long been recognized
as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility."). It is
noteworthy that Shreveport Grain, decided in the same term as Norwegian Nitrogen, seemed to
say precisely the opposite. See note 153 supra.
156. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
157. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935).
158. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., I K. DAvIs, supra note 8, at 150-51; Jaffe, supra note 8, at 567; Note, supra
note 8, at 261-67.
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appointed to enforce it."16 On this analysis, that is so both because
the legislature may deliberately refuse to make choices or, even if the
legislature tries to settle the outstanding issues, "[1]anguage and expe-
rience alike can never be so divinely comprehensive as to make clear
provision for all future cases." 161 Implicit in this position are two as-
sumptions which Professor Jaffe does not discuss: first, that it is not
possible to distinguish the interpretation that statutes inevitably need
from the discretion to make policy; and second, that discretion con-
ferred by a statute involves legislative rather than executive or judicial
power. These assumptions are open to question. Take, for example, a
criminal code that attempts to restate the elements of common law
crimes, such as theft. Are we prepared to say that judicial decisions to
resolve ambiguities in that statute are policy making rather than inter-
pretation? Are we also prepared to say that the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion not to indict a given suspect is an exercise of
legislative rather than executive power?
Although Friedrich Hayek declines to argue against delegation, his
writings have suggested to me a way of distinguishing legislative from
executive or judicial powers.1 62 Hayek argues that, in regulating the
private sector, a government that seeks to preserve liberty should issue
general rules of conduct rather than empower itself to issue ad hoc
commands in furtherance of governmental goals. Hayek recognizes
that these rules would require application and interpretation, 1 63 essen-
tially executive and judicial functions. Hayek also sees no clash with
the concept of liberty if government organizes public enterprises, such
as the management of public property or national defense, through ad
160. Jaffe, supra note 8, at 360. See also J. FREEDMAN, supra note 41, at 79. Professor
Jaffe's view that every statute necessarily delegates legislative power suggests an approach akin to
the "intelligible principle" test that focuses on the quantity of power conferred rather than its
quality. This approach has proved judicially unmanageable and incapable of fulfilling the delega-
tion doctrine's purposes. See notes 24-85 supra and accompanying text.
161. Jaffe, supra note 8, at 361 (footnote omitted).
162. See F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (3 vols., 1973, 1976 & 1979) [herein.
after cited as F. HAYEK, LAW]. Hayek does not argue that it must be the national legislature
rather than agencies or local governments that must issue the general rules; he makes explicit
that his argument is not against delegation. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 211-12
(1960) [hereinafter cited as F. HAYEK, LIBERTY]. However, his role and perspective are different
from the Court's. He is trying to formulate what for him would be an ideal constitution, not
interpreting the United States Constitution. His mind, as he acknowledged, is attuned more to
Austrian and British institutions than to those in the United States, where provincial and local
governments are not delegates of the national legislature. Id. at viii. In addition, he is an econo-
mist and political philosopher rather than a lawyer. In any event, some of his conceptual frame-
work has proved useful to me and, in return, the test of delegation proposed here would promote
Hayek's purpose of governance by general rules.
163. 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, supra note 162, at 94-123; 2 F. HAYEK, LAW, supra note 162, at 31-
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hoc commands rather than rules.1 4
This Article argues that Congress may not confer power which is
"legislative" in character. However, legislative power includes neither
the interpretation or application of a rule nor the exercise of powers
that are "executive" in character, including management of public
enterprises.
Prohibiting all delegations of legislative power might be criticized
as old-fashioned, formalistic, or rigid. 165 While jurists may once have
thought that the term "legislative Powers" was self-defining, that is no
longer true. It will be shown in the next section that a meaning can be
given to "legislative Powers" that has a root in precedent and corre-
sponds roughly to the purposes of the delegation doctrine. The
Court's current approach to delegation attempts a more finely tuned
analysis, purporting to allow those delegations of legislative powers
that do not offend the delegation doctrine's purposes, while the ap-
proach proposed here may stop some such legislation. This rigidity is
appropriate. The Court is interpreting a constitution rather than writ-
ing one. The language of article I, "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,"' 166 suggests
a bar on the delegation of any legislative power; it is hard to see in this
clause a textual basis for the delegation of some legislative power but
not all. 167 Treating the language as a license for the Court to balance
the purposes or goals of the delegation doctrine rather than as a rule
against the delegation of legislative power puts the courts in a legisla-
tive role, as the Supreme Court's inability to articulate a consistent
rationale for its results suggests. In any event, the Court's approach,
supposedly geared to the doctrine's purposes, has failed to serve those
purposes.
Finally, the proposed test is doctrinally consistent with recent
Supreme Court decisions in delegation and related areas while the cur-
rent test is not. The opening sentence of article I was read literally in
the recent Chadha decision invalidating the legislative veto as a dele-
gation of legislative authority.1 68 The analogous opening sentence of
article III - "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
164. 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, supra note 162, at 124-44.
165. See, ag., Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 578 (1984).
166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
167. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 1672-73 (questioning textual basis for current doctrine).
See also 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 157-59 (discussing problematic intent of Framers concern-
ing delegations of legislative power).
168. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983).
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in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts" 169 - was given a
similarly strict reading in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Construction Co., 170 invalidating a statute giving article
III powers to article I bankruptcy courts. In both Chadha and North-
ern Pipeline, the opinions refused to balance separation of powers con-
cerns against expediency, 171 the factor at the root of the Court's
current quantitative approach to delegation. The qualitative approach
harmonizes with separation of powers precedents which generally rest
upon a distinction between legislative, executive, and judicial pow-
ers.172 The quantitative approach, because it pays little attention to
the kind of power that a statute confers, is out of step and confusing to
all concerned.
B. A Proposed Definition of Legislative Power
1. Rules of Private Conduct: Rules Statutes Versus Goals Statutes
Promulgating rules of private conduct is a legislative power, while
the interpretation of statutes is ordinarily understood to be an exercise
of judicial or executive power. 173 Some statutes, however, call upon
officials to make rules of private conduct rather than interpret them.
In administrative law, for instance, we speak of agencies issuing legis-
lative as well as interpretive rules. 174 I wish first to propose a way to
distinguish the statutes that call for rule making from those that re-
quire interpretation and then to discuss whether the distinction is a
meaningful one.
169. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
170. 458 U.S. 50, 64-65 (1982) (plurality opinion). This case has been criticized as embody-
ing too strict a view of separation of powers. See Strauss, supra note 165, at 629-33. Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 53 U.S.L.W. 5057 (U.S. July 1, 1985) may involve some
backtracking from Northern Pipeline.
171. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-45; Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 73.
172. See, eg., Chadha, 462 U.S. 929 (1983); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
173. The judiciary obviously is called upon to interpret statutes in dealing with cases while
the executive needs to do so in enforcing or administering the statutes. Congress may also assign
the interpretation of some statutes to article I tribunals. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-
52 (1932).
174. Judge Leventhal emphasized this distinction in an early case considering the validity of
the legislative veto:
One's view of the one-house veto issue may be affected. . . if it should develop that Con-
gress itself distinguished between regulations that are "interpretive," and therefore more
aligned with the responsibility of the executive branch, and regulations that are "legisla-
tive," that implement or carry forward a statutory mandate in ways not specified by the
statute, and with respect to which a more substantial congressional role might be proper.
Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 659 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (footnote omitted),
affd. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977).
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I have suggested elsewhere a distinction between what I call "rules
statutes" and "goals statutes." 175 Rules statutes state rules demar-
cating permissible from impermissible conduct; the job of deciding
what these rules mean in particular situations is interpretation. Goals
statutes state goals, which usually conflict, and delegate the job of rec-
onciling any such conflicts to others who are entrusted with promul-
gating the rules of conduct necessary to achieve those goals. Goals
statutes delegate legislative power.
The rules statute/goals statute distinction can be illustrated as fol-
lows. Imagine a national statute that limits air pollution from any
power plant to a certain rate of emission. It would be a rules statute
because it demarcates permissible from impermissible conduct. Con-
gress is telling the private parties what they may or may not do. In
contrast, a statute that empowers an agency to set controls on power
plants in order to reduce the total of emissions from all power plants
to a certain level would be a goals statute because it does not specify a
rule of conduct for plants but rather provides only a goal, leaving to
the delegate the balancing of interests necessary for determining how
the burden of achieving that goal would be allocated. In this instance
the delegate would be deciding how to circumscribe the private par-
ties' conduct.
As another example, imagine a statute that establishes a tax at a
given schedule of rates. It would be a rules statute because it provides
a rule of conduct - pay the taxes at the rates specified. In contrast,
imagine a statute that empowers the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue to raise a certain amount of money by imposing taxes as necessary
to achieve that goal. This would plainly be a goals statute.
In both examples the goals statutes have relatively simple, specific
goals, but create discretion in allocating the burden necessary to
achieve them. They would still be goals statutes if the goals were
broadened to include not just reducing pollution a certain amount or
raising certain revenues, but also promoting equity, stimulating
growth industries, and other less specific goals.
The rules statutes also have goals; they may in fact have precisely
the same goals as the goals statutes. But the goals in a rules statute are
not the legislative act, but rather the purpose of that act, as expressed
perhaps in either a preambulatory purposes section or in legislative
history. In contrast, the goals in a goals statute are not merely the
purposes of the legislative act but are the essence of the legislative act
commanding the delegate to achieve the goals.
175. See Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 783-89.
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A rules statute requires the legislature to assume more responsibil-
ity and hence to be more accountable for the bearing of that responsi-
bility than does a goals statute. In a rules statute, the legislature
allocates rights and duties in the very course of indicating the kind of
conduct that is permitted or not permitted. In a goals statute, the
legislature does not go that far; it indicates legislative hopes and re-
quires a delegate to allocate rights and duties corresponding to those
hopes. Given the political nature of the legislative process, a goals
statute is likely to express popular hopes that are inherently contradic-
tory and leave the delegate with the unhappy job of dealing with the
people's disappointments and conflicts. In a goals statute, the legisla-
ture therefore tends to do only half a job - to distribute benefits with-
out taking responsibility for the costs. The bill for the benefits comes
later and on the agency's letterhead. The agency gets the blame while
Congress gets only the praise.
A goals statute empowers the agency to complete the job by mak-
ing rules of conduct. As the Court stated in Fletcher v. Peck, 1 76 "[i]t is
the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for
the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals
in society would seem to be the duty of other departments." 177
Holding goals statutes that would regulate commerce or tax to be
improper delegations would serve the purposes of the delegation doc-
trine. Goals statutes frustrate judicial review and congressional
electoral accountability. They enable legislators to escape the difficult,
value-laden choices implicit in balancing competing policy goals and
distributing rights and benefits between different groups in the popula-
tion. It is theoretically possible for Congress to make hard choices in a
goals statute. To do so, it would have to state not just goals, but also
formulae that the delegate must use to decide how to deal with the
conflicts among the goals and decide how the duties sufficient to
achieve these goals should be distributed among the population. In
the case of air pollution, for example, the legislation would have to
state methods to weigh health goals against other goals and other
methods to be used to distribute the clean-up burden among industries
and within industries. But governance by such complicated formulae
boggles the mind; it would exceed the ordinary capacity of science and
government to deal with complexity. 178 Goals statutes also mask leg-
176. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Justice Powell recently reasserted this point in his
Chadha concurrence. 462 U.S. at 967 (Powell, J., concurring).
177. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136.
178. For a discussion of why such seemingly specific goals are unlikely to be productive in
the air pollution field see Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 762-63, 790-94, 798-803.
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islators' actions from the public because they operate at the abstract
level of purposes while rules statutes make the legislative decisions
substantive and concrete by stating what people can or cannot do in
the statute.
The rules statute/goals statute distinction suggested here is funda-
mentally different from the "intelligible principle" notion that has
proved so unsatisfactory. 179 The rules statute/goals statute distinction
is also different from a distinction between vague and specific stan-
dards. 180 A goals statute can be relatively specific in that a goal may
be quite precise, e.g., raise so much revenue, reduce power plant emis-
sions by so many tons. At the same time a rule in a rules statute will
always be general in the sense that it will require interpretation.'1
8
The need for interpretation comes not just from the ambiguity of lan-
guage but also from the need to read statutes in context. 8 2 Indeed, a
statute that outlawed "unreasonable" pollution could be considered a
rules statute in a society with a clear understanding of what consti-
tuted unreasonable pollution which could provide a basis for interpre-
tation.'8 3 Without the understanding, however, what was forbidden
would be largely in the discretion of some executive or judicial official.
This analysis suggests the necessity of distinguishing rules that re-
quire interpretation from statements in the form of rules that in fact
call for policy making. What marks a rule, in my view, is its statement
of permissible versus impermissible conduct. Thus the statute that
prohibited unreasonable pollution in a society where there were estab-
lished customs as to pollution would qualify as a rule no less than a
statute that limited pollution to given numeric quantities. In contrast,
a statute that prohibited pollution that an agency deemed unreasona-
ble where there were no established customs would not provide a rule,
but would rather call upon the agency to do so. Defining "rule" in
terms of the provision of a meaningful statement of proper or im-
proper conduct fits the delegation doctrine's purposes since those pur-
poses depend upon the voters' ability to understand what the
legislation means with regard to their own conduct.
Legislated rules will require interpretation, which is not a mechan-
179. See notes 24-85 supra and accompanying text.
180. See T. Lowi, supra note 14, at 97-107.
181. See Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25, 52 (R.
Summers ed. 1968); see also H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 156 (tent. ed. 1958).
182. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 181, at 1156-57, 1219, 1411, 1415-16.
183. Professor Jaffe, for example, noted that the ostensibly vague standard of inferior quality
tea under review in Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 494 (1904), was anchored in "the settled
judgment of the trade." L. JAFFE, supra note 86, at 57.
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ical process. But it differs in my view from policy making in that rule
interpretation must defer to the value judgments explicit or implicit in
the statute while policy making requires making value judgments. I
recognize that some people hold that there is no difference between
interpretation and policy making and that other people, who hold
there is a difference, debate how to describe it.184 Nonetheless, the
184. What, if anything, is the difference between the judgment required in interpretation and
in policy making? Debate on this question has generated a large body of literature. See, e.g.,
authorities cited infra See also Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. RaV. 739 (1982);
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. Rav. 1685 (1976).
That scholars debate how to describe the difference does not mean that it does not exist. H.L.A.
Hart steers a middle course between formalism and legal realism. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAw, 121-50 (1961); Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 608 (1958). Formalism, viewing the interpretation of rules as purely deductive, is an error
for Hart because it fails to take account of the "open texture" of law. H. HART, supra, at 122.
Hart holds that rules cannot take account of all situations in advance because "we are men, not
gods." Id. at 125. Hart also finds error in legal realism, because it views rules as nothing but
pretenses covering up judges' exercise of policy-making power. The legal realist is "a disap-
pointed absolutist; he has found that rules are not all they would be in a formalist's heaven, ..
and... expresses his disappointment by the denial that there are, or can be, any rules." Id. at
135.
Hart illustrates his own approach, as distinguished from formalism and legal realism, by the
example of a legal rule that "forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this
forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles?" Hart, supra, at
607. For Hart, the word "vehicle" must have some "core" meaning and a "penumbra" of debat-
able meanings. Id. This "penumbra" must not be ruled upon mechanically "but in the light of
aims, purposes, and policies, though not necessarily in the light of anything we would call moral
principles." Id. at 614. The formalist would err by looking at just the letter of the rule rather
than the spirit. The legal realist would take neither the letter of the rule nor the purposes of its
framers seriously, but would be guided by personal opinion.
Hart sees an inevitable tension between the letter and the spirit in rules interpretation. Or, in
terminology of this Article, an interpreter of a rules statute would have to take account of the
statute's goals in interpreting the words in which its rule is written. Concern for the spirit of the
rule in interpretation would require reference to the rule's goal to define the meaning of the letter
- for example to define the word "vehicle" in Professor Hart's example above. But even if the
interpreter reads the letter in the light of the goal, the letter may fail to serve fully the goal or
may forbid conduct that does not offend the goal. Assume that the purpose of prohibiting vehi-
cles in the park was to control noise; no interpretation of the rule would allow punishment for
playing a loud radio, yet a perfectly silent, full-sized electric car might be forbidden. For the
interpreter to disregard the letter of the rule altogether would raise problems such as notice, with
its due process implications, and separation of powers.
The tension between letter and spirit faced by the rule interpreter is distinct from the choice
faced by the legislature between enacting a rules statute or a goals statute. The legislature could
have passed a goals statute - for instance, authorizing the Park Commissioner to issue regula-
tions as necessary to control noise in the parks. The Commissioner could then have dealt, as the
need arose, with roller skates, silent cars, and loud radios. Hart, of course, understands that
delegation is one way of dealing with the difficulty of drafting rules. H. HART, supra, at 127.
But Hart is also clear that the rule interpreter and the one delegated the power to make rules
have different duties. At least, when the case is within the core meaning of the rule, the rule
interpreter is bound to effect that core meaning. Hart, supra, at 612. But what about those
penumbral cases where the rule's precise meaning is unclear? Ronald Dworkin contrasts two
approaches to such hard cases. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975). In
one, the rule interpreter engages in interstitial legislation. Dworkin seems to identify Hart with
this approach. See Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The HartDworkin Dis-
pute, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 473, 474, 477 (1977). According to this approach, hard cases turn the
interpreter into a policy maker. Dworkin rejected this approach and embraced an alternative in
which the interpreter would not have the broad, policy-making discretion associated with legis-
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claim that there is a difference between interpretation and policy mak-
ing is particularly plausible when a rules statute is at issue.
lating. See Dworkin, supra, at 1058-60. Under this approach, if the letter of the rule is unclear,
the interpreter looks to its purposes and those of related rules. The interpreter uses the purposes
to look backward for indicia of the kind of rule that the legislature would have intended to have
applied to situations of the kind at hand, while a policy maker would look forward to potential
consequences of alternative decisions to see what best serves the purposes.
Dworkin's approach supports the distinction drawn in this Article between legislating rules
and interpreting rules. It is therefore necessary to look at some of the criticism Professor Dwor-
kin's work has drawn to see if it undercuts the distinction between legislation and interpretation
herein advanced. See, eg., Soper, supra, and authorities cited therein. See also Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv. 373 (1982); Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEX. L. REV. 299 (1983).
One criticism of Dworkin's account of interpretation is that it is impossible to implement.
See, eg., Soper, supra, at 502-06. If so, the well-intentioned interpreter could not help but make
policy. Dworkin's interpreter would have to deal not only with the letter of the rules and their
goals, but also the probability that the goals would conflict and so lead the interpreter in different
directions at once. Dworkin would have the interpreter deal with such conflicts in goals by
gauging the "weight" of each goal as it is treated in assorted statutes, precedents, and other
authorities and then deciding in favor of the interpretation which is most consistent with this
balancing of legal concerns. Dworkin, supra, at 1082-101. Dworkin acknowledges the difficulty
of this task by calling his judge Hercules. Id. The herculean labor is apparently meant as an
ideal to which mortal judges may aspire. Some of Dworkin's critics argue, however, that the task
makes no sense even as an ideal, because Dworkin specifies no method by which Hercules can
deduce the "weight" of conflicting goals. See, eg., Soper, supra, at 504.
Dworkin has defined "rule" in a way that makes his position more vulnerable to this criticism
than my definition of "rules statute." For Dworkin, a statute that provides that the Commis-
sioner shall issue orders to stop "unreasonable noise" in the park would state a rule, even though
the term "unreasonable" lacked social meaning. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L.
REv. 14, 28-29 (1967). Such a statute in my analysis would be a goals statute, impermissible and
so never able to cause difficulties for Dworkin's Olympian interpreter. Interpreting a rules stat-
ute would be less herculean than interpreting a goals statute. See text at notes 185-88 infra.
Another criticism of Dworkin's approach is that, even if it were feasible, it is not what judges
do. Soper, supra, at 506-09. Dworkin's thesis is at once normative and descriptive - it purports
to account both for what judges ought to do and what judges actually do. Id. at 473-74. The
normative claim that is argued for here is more modest than Dworkin's. My normative claim
extends exclusively to the interpretation of statutes unlike Dworkin's, which would seem to in-
clude constitutional decisions. Dworkin, supra, at 1083-85. Furthermore, my claim is not at all
descriptive. Agencies, if not courts, have approached goals statutes as policy makers rather than
interpreters. In addition, mistaken views about the delegation of legislative power increasingly
have led courts and agencies to interpret other statutes by reference to their goals rather than
their rules; section C of this part will deal with this error.
Another criticism of Dworkin is that he exaggerates the difference between himself and Hart
- that he has not so much come up with a new approach as misconceived some of those who
came before him. See Soper, supra, at 486, 507-16; 2 F. HAYEK, LAW, supra note 162, at 56.
Whatever the merits of this criticism in general, there are some grounds for Dworkin's ascribing
to Hart the belief that judges should engage in interstitial legislation in hard cases. Hart talks of
judges having "fresh choices" in penumbral cases and of "choosing between the competing inter-
ests in the way which best satisfies us." H. HART, supra, at 125-26. On the other hand, in such
passages, Hart is distinguishing his position from formalism and may not have gone so far as to
say that interpreters have discretion in the strong sense that legislators do. Hart in some other
passages may indeed be saying quite the opposite:
The . . . description of. . . interpretative extension of old rules to new eases as judicial
legislation. . . gives no hint of the differences between a deliberate fiat or decision to treat
the new case in the same way as past cases and a recognition (in which there is little that is
deliberate or even voluntary) that inclusion of the new case under the rule will implement or
articulate a continuing and identical purpose, hitherto less specifically apprehended.
Hart, supra, at 627. The criticism of Dworkin that he misconceives Hart, if valid, does not
detract from the substantiality of the test of legislation offered here, but rather brings to it the
considerable aid of Hart.
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This is so for three reasons. First, the rules statute would provide
a clear answer for many cases. By contrast, under a goals statute, the
legislation may well fail to indicate the required result for any category
of cases. Congress has in fact legislated in this way as to some ex-
tremely important problems.18 5
Second, rule interpreters routinely seek guidance as to the meaning
of the text of a rule by referring to its goals. In those hard cases where
the goals conflict, a rules statute helps the interpreter determine the
relative weight of the conflicting goals.18 6 Because the rule itself, by
definition, indicates the outcome for a wide range of cases, the legisla-
ture must set out at least some indications of priority among the goals.
In a goals statute, by contrast, the legislature may recite conflicting
goals without establishing any priorities among them. In fact, it is ex-
tremely difficult for a legislature that wants to express clear degrees of
priority to do so in a goals statute. Air pollution legislation may say
that health, for instance, is more important than economic costs, but
to what degree? It is not very meaningful to say "to a reasonable de-
gree." So a rules statute makes more credible the notion that a rule
interpreter is expressing values inherent in the legislation rather than
giving vent to personal preferences.
Third, interpreting rules statutes differs from exercising discretion
under goals statutes in its meaning for stare decisis. Stare decisis
makes interpretations of rules statutes binding on future cases that are
identical and guides decisions in future cases that are similar. Under a
goals statute, however, policy decisions made at one time are not nec-
essarily precedent for future decisions nor should they be. Even if a
seemingly identical case appears, unsatisfactory results under old deci-
sions, or new circumstances, may argue for reconsideration of the
"precedent." The policy maker is free to reverse prior policy for any
rational reason, 187 but a court must usually meet a much higher stan-
dard to overcome stare decisis in changing the interpretation of a stat-
ute.18 8 This means that where an agency working under a rules statute
believes that there should be a change in policy, it must return to the
legislature.
The distinction between interpreting rules and making policy by
promulgating rules can be illustrated by a series of examples involving
185. See Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 751-56 (discussing the Clean Air Act). See also, eg.,
Consumers Union v. Sawhill, 393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.), affd. sub nom. Consumers Union v.
Zarb, 523 F.2d 1404 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (analyzing the Emergency Petroleum Alloca-
tion Act).
186. See note 184 supra.
187. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 181, at 1302-47.
188. See id. at 1368-80.
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price regulation statutes. The most common of these statutes require
public utility commissions to set the rates charged by natural monopo-
lies so as to produce revenues that are "just and reasonable." 189 "Just
and reasonable," although initially an unclear term, had by 1910 be-
come a term of art signifying revenues that would cover the costs of
providing the service, including a return on capital commensurate
with that earned on investments of similar size and risk.190 The stat-
utes, as so understood, provided a benchmark for calculating allowa-
ble public utility profits - the market value of inputs, including
capital, needed to provide the service. The application of that rule
would not be a simple arithmetical calculation by any means, 191 but
such statutes provided a way of reconciling the goals of minimizing
rates and attracting capital preferable to leaving all the commissions
free to craft their own, unpredictable ways of balancing these goals.
192
This term of art in rate regulation statutes constitutes a rule be-
cause the agency has something against which to gauge the public util-
ity rates - the cost of providing service. Consider, in contrast, the
application of the "just and reasonable" rate-making rubric to the reg-
ulation of natural gas production in the 1950s.193 How was one to
measure the worth of natural gas in the ground? It was unlike the
labor or other inputs used in monopolies such as public utilities since
natural gas did not then have a significant market value independent
of the regulated interstate market. That is, the market value of the gas
in the ground was a function of the price that could be charged by gas
producers. In this context, the Court allowed the Federal Power
Commission to depart from the traditional interpretation of "just and
reasonable"; the Commission could adopt any method of calculating
allowable revenues that served the purposes of the Act. 194 This con-
189. See. ag., Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
190. "The controlling principle came to be known as the rule of Smyth v. Ames. ... L.
JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 43 (1976). Before
Smyth v. Ames, it is doubtful that the "just and reasonable" language could be considered precise
enough to constitute a rule.
191. The comparable earnings method for calculating required utility revenue of course pro-
vides "only a very rough approximation of the amount one would have to pay shareholders to
put up capital were the industry in a competitive, rather than a regulated, environment." Breyer,
Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV.
L. REv. 547, 563 (1979) (footnote omitted). Interpretation is not just a mechanical process. It
requires judgment, as the example of rate making for natural monopolies might suggest. Deter-
mining a utility's cost of providing service involves more than adding up given numbers. In
fixing the value of capital used by the utility, for instance, the Commission would need to deter-
mine the rate of return earned on investments of similar riskiness; this is a matter of judgment.
192. See Jalfe, supra note 8, at 574.
193. The regulation of natural gas at the wellhead was mandated by the Court in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954).
194. See Federal Power Commn. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602-03 (1944).
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struction turned the statute into a goals statute.
Also in contrast to the traditional rate-making statutes are various
enactments that have given agencies power to regulate prices during
times of war or inflation, 95 to prosecute the charging of excessive
prices, 1 96 or to recoup excessive wartime profits. 197 In upholding some
of these statutes 198 against delegation challenges, the Court has used
traditional public utility rate making as a precedent in finding that the
statute ,provided a standard of decision. 199 That reliance was mis-
placed since the statutes provided no measure, such as the cost of pro-
viding services, with which to gauge what prices or profits were
unreasonable or excessive.2°° In Yakus v. United States, for instance,
the Administrator was to set prices by taking the price charged at a
given time in the past and then adjusting that price to take account of
a wide variety of goals.201 If those statutes were to be upheld, reliance
ought to have been placed on grounds other than that the statute sup-
plied a clear standard of decision which the agency was merely called
upon to apply to the facts of a given case.
202
2. Independent Executive Powers: The War and Foreign Affairs
Example
Legislation that leaves the Executive Branch with discretion does
not delegate legislative power where the discretion is to be exercised
over matters already within the scope of executive power. One major
example of such executive power created by the Constitution concerns
war and foreign affairs. For example, an exercise by Congress of its
powers to declare war and provide armed forces to fight that war
20 3
leaves the President broad discretion to deploy the military forces to
accomplish the war's objectives; Congress has enacted a goals statute,
but it is not a delegation of legislative power because the President's
195. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944); cf Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge
panel) (statute authorizing price regulation during "economic emergency").
196. See United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
197. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
198. Not all were upheld; the Lever Act was struck down on vagueness grounds in United
States v. L. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81, 82 (1921).
199. See, eg., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 786 (1948); Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414,427 (1944); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746-48 (D.D.C.
1971) (three-judge panel).
200. See Jaffe, supra note 8, at 568-70.
201. 321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944).
202. See notes 203-38 infra and accompanying text.
203. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-13.
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power derives from article II rather than article 1.204 The scope of the
President's discretion is, however, affected by congressional action.
For instance, Congress controls whether and against whom war may
be declared. The President's discretion in the conduct of the war is
not a delegation because the President is not exercising legislative
power; the President is not making law but making war. ,Similarly, the
President's negotiation of a treaty subject to ratification by the Sen-
ate20 5 bears some resemblance to a one-house veto, but in no way in-
volves a delegation of legislative power because the Constitution
expressly confers these treaty powers on the President and the Senate.
Congress' role regarding wars and treaties is not to delegate its own
power. Rather, through the authorization of the use of executive
power or the ratification of its use, Congress provides a check on mis-
use of power by the Executive.
When the President fulfills a role other than lawmaking, executive
discretion does not offend the delegation doctrine's purposes. While
the delegation doctrine seeks to make legislators accountable to voters
for the allocation of rights and duties in society, the primary issue in
foreign affairs is, in theory, not allocation of rights and duties within
the nation but competition between this nation and others. To be sure,
the conduct of a war or the terms of a treaty may affect domestic
rights and duties but this will be incidental to their international as-
pects. Moreover, the presidential power over wars and treaties, with
its great potential for abuse, need not be considered nonlegislative on
grounds of mere convenience, which cannot justify elimination of the
normal checks and balances of the separation of powers. 20 6 Treating
the Executive's war and treaty powers as nonlegislative can be justified
solely on grounds of national necessity.
20 7
How broad is executive power? As Professor Tribe points out, the
provisions of article II, section 1 "that '[t]he executive Power shall be
vested in a President'. . . cannot be read as mere shorthand" for the
specific enumerations that follow. 208 The imprecision of the textual
204. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
205. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
206. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
207. The power to wage war, for example, has been held to be "the power to wage war
successfully" in defense of the nation and its Constitution. See Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 224 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943). See generally Keynes,
Democracy, Judicial Review and the War Powers, 8 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 69 (1981). This power
does not, however, go so far as to suspend the Bill of Rights. See, eg., United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 88 (1921); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251
U.S. 146, 156 (1919); Exparte MUlligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121-27 (1866).
208. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158 (1978). For instance, the President
has conducted extensive military operations without declarations of war and entered into agree-
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limits on the President's foreign affairs powers combined with the duty
to see that the laws be faithfully executed 2o9 "have come to be re-
garded as explicit textual manifestations of the inherent presidential
power to administer, if not necessarily to formulate, the foreign policy
of the United States."'21
0
The rationale by which the Court has attempted to justify its broad
reading of executive powers in matters of war and foreign affairs has
been severely criticized, 211 and its precise scope is uncertain.212 For
now, however, my purpose is not to attempt to define the limits of
executive power and the extent to which they are exclusive, concur-
rent, or authorized by legislative action, but to suggest that the con-
cept can be of use in constructing a better delegation doctrine. To this
end, I wish to examine some key cases which did or may have con-
cerned executive powers.
Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States,21 3 probably the first dele-
gation case,214 could have been decided through the use of this concept
of executive power. The statute at issue was passed in response to
British and French edicts allowing violation of United States shipping.
Congress embargoed the shipping of both countries for a time, but
empowered the President to extend the embargo if he found that either
Britain or France continued its offensive edicts.215 The Court rejected
a claim that the statute delegated legislative power to the President on
the ground that the President was doing no more than executing a law
by finding a fact.216 Under the analysis of this Article, the statute was
a rules statute - containing the rule that shipping should be embar-
goed if either France or Britain maintained certain edicts. The Court
could instead have chosen to interpret the statute as an authorization
of independent executive power in regard to war and foreign affairs,
ments with other nations without Senate approvals. Whether or not these activities can some-
how be justified under any of the article H enumerated powers, established case law supports
executive powers beyond those enumerated powers. See, eg., United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926).
209. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
210. L. TRIBE, supra note 208, at 164.
211. See, eg., Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. RV. 29 (1972); Lofgrcn,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J.
1 (1973); Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 623
(1972).
212. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
213. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
214. See Jaffe, supra note 8, at 562.
215. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 382-83.
216. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 388. See also S. BARBER, supra note 22, at 53-59.
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but the grounds upon which the Court chose to rely did no violence to
the delegation doctrine.
Field v. Clark2 7 offered the Court a similar choice. At issue was a
tariff statute that removed duties on certain agricultural imports, pro-
viding, however, that duties be reimposed on imports from countries
that the President found imposed "reciprocally unequal and unreason-
able" duties on our exports.21 8 The Court upheld the statute on two
alternative grounds. It said that the President in reimposing the tariff
was not making law but rather finding fact,219 although the tariff stat-
ute involved "a wide and uncertain area of judgment. '220 In the alter-
native, the Court noted many examples of the broad powers conferred
upon the President "with reference to trade and commerce:
' 221
[T]hey all show that, in the judgment of the legislative branch of the
government, it is often desirable, if not essential for the protection of the
interests of our people, against the unfriendly or discriminating regula-
tions established by foreign governments, in the interests of their people,
to invest the President with large discretion in matters arising out of the
execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with other
nations.2
22
If a broad view of the President's powers is accepted, the result in
Field v. Clark is correct.223 More troubling, however, is that part of
the opinion that depicts an essentially discretionary executive decision
about whether foreign tariffs are unequal as findings of fact while pi-
ously pronouncing that "Congress cannot delegate legislative power to
the President." 224 Such "hopelessly fictional rationalization" 225 led to
trouble in subsequent cases.
The statute at issue in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States
226
resembled that in Field v. Clark It provided that the President could
increase the duties on imports up to fifty percent when he found this
necessary to "equalize. .. differences in costs of production in the
United States and the principal competing country. '227 The apparent
arithmetic simplicity of the President's task is belied by the need to
determine such intricate and uncertain policy matters as appropriate
217. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
218. 143 U.S. at 692. This standard plainly echoes Cargo of the Brig Aurora.
219. 143 U.S. at 692-93.
220. Jaffe, supra note 8, at 566.
221. 143 U.S. at 683.
222. 143 U.S. at 691.
223. See Jaffe, supra- note 8, at 566.
224. 143 U.S. at 692-93.
225. Jaffe, supra note 8, at 561.
226. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
227. 276 U.S. at 401.
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wage and profit rates in given industries in this country. Professor
Jaffe concluded that "an analysis of the Act and even more the history
of its administration shows a tremendous scope for manipulation. ' 228
The Court's opinion upholding the statute relied squarely on Field v.
Clark 229 The rationale that the President was only executing a statute
by finding facts or acting according to an established legislative princi-
ple or standard was just as much a fiction in Hampton as in Field v.
Clark Hampton, moreover, made little effort to rely on the special
powers of the President in foreign affairs, perhaps because it would
have been harder to do so. In Hampton, the President's inquiry was
whether or not our industries were making enough money in the face
of overseas competition, which is in large part a matter of domestic,
not foreign, policy.
Panama Refining2 30 and Schechter2 31 relied on Cargo of the Brig
Aurora, Field v. Clark, and Hampton in entirely domestic contexts
without regard to their roots in matters of war and foreign affairs.
Similarly, in the cases dealing with price and profit regulations enacted
in response to World War II, the primary ground of decision was not a
doctrine of authorization of independent executive power, but rather
the fiction that the statutes provided standards.232 Justice Roberts,
dissenting in one of those cases, 233 as well as Justice Jackson, dissent-
ing in Korematsu v. United States,234 warned that it would be better
for the Court to rely on war powers rather than run the risk that the
stretching of the Constitution to meet the exigencies of wartime should
carry over to peacetime. Grounds for such an approach could have
been found in Field v. Clark More recent cases do appear to indicate
that in the war and foreign affairs contexts, legislation may leave the
President broader powers than would be permissible in domestic mat-
ters.2 35 Instead of relying entirely or primarily on such grounds, the
228. Jaffe, supra note 8, at 569.
229. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409-11.
230. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 423-24, 429-30 (1935).
231. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935) (citing only
Hampton, but relying on Panama Refining which cited the other cases).
232. See Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 419-23 (1944). These cases cited the war more as an explanation of the motive for delega-
tion than as constitutional justification.
233. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 459-60 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
234. 323 U.S. 214, 244-45 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
235. See, eg., Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
684 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426
U.S. 548, 559-60 & n.10 (1976); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 779-80 (1948); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). See also Belknap, The New Deal and
the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEx. L. REv. 67 (1983).
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World War II cases stated delegation arguments primarily in terms
that could apply equally well to the same type of legislation enacted
during peacetime and dealing entirely with domestic problems.236 The
warnings of Justices Roberts and Jackson were prescient. These cases
supplied the basis for upholding expansive peacetime delegations.
237
As Clinton Rossiter concluded in regard to this line of opinions, "the
Court has had little success in preventing the precedents of war from
becoming precedents of peace."
'238
Analysis of these cases in terms of separate, constitutionally cre-
ated executive powers could have avoided this result. Where the Con-
stitution gives the Executive independent powers in article II, as it
does over war and foreign affairs, action by Congress authorizing their
use cannot be an improper delegation of legislative powers. It is the
authorization of the use of the executive powers as appropriate that is
the legislative act, not the exercise of the executive powers. This dis-
tinction lies at the heart of my proposed test.
3. Management of Public Property Versus Regulation of Private
Property
A statute allowing the Executive broad discretion to manage pub-
lic property to the extent such management does not govern private
conduct is not a delegation of legislative power. The power to regulate
and manage public property, though vested in Congress, is not an arti-
cle I legislative power. It is granted separately, by article IV, in the
property clause.239 Congress' exercise of this seemingly plenary power
by vesting it in the Executive, which would then have an article II
obligation to execute that power,240 is therefore not subject to limita-
tions placed on the delegation of powers under article I. As discussed
below, this was an altogether sensible approach which the Framers
236. See notes 230-34 supra and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971)
(three-judge panel); Goldstein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968). Indeed, the holdings
of Yakus and Lichter effectively tolled the death knell for delegation challenges for twenty-five
years. These decisions made it unnecessary even to speak about delegation. See generally text at
notes 37-70 supra.
238. C. ROSSITER & R. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN
CHIEF 129 (expanded ed. 1976). In an interesting reversal of the erosion of peacetime precedents
by wartime cases, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court initially created the domestic/
foreign affairs distinction in Curtiss-Wright to "get around Panama and Schechter." United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 630 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, Ivanov v.
United States, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
239. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 reads in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the. . .Property belonging to
the United States ....
240. U.S. CONST. art. II.
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took to an intricate and special problem of superintending public prop-
erty. Management of public property should not be considered law
making - that is, government of private conduct - because it does
not involve, in the words of Fletcher v. Peck, "general rules for the
government of society. '241 There are two points that this section will
make in this regard. First, the administration of public property or
enterprises has not been and should not be considered legislative.
Congress should be able to provide for the operation of, say, federal
lands, the postal service, or federal buildings by the enactment of goals
statutes that direct the executive branch to achieve goals that Congress
articulates. Second, some benefits and privileges conferred by the gov-
ernment, such as welfare and other entitlements programs, should be
considered private rather than public property for the purposes of the
delegation doctrine and so could be regulated only by legislated rules
rather than by discretion authorized in goals statutes.
The management of public enterprises differs critically from the
governance of private conduct. As Hayek points out, governance of
the private sector is normally negative; conduct is prohibited rather
than mandated.242 That one may do whatever is not prohibited allows
persons, within these bounds, to pursue their own private purposes.
For Hayek, this negative character of regulation safeguards liberty and
promotes innovation. 4 3
The management of public enterprises, in contrast, is ordinarily
positive. If government wants a new federal office building, for in-
stance, the result must be reached by positive mandate rather than
prohibition. In such cases, the legislation is addressed to public offi-
cials rather than private persons. For example, "the Administrator of
the General Services Administration shall construct a building to
serve the purpose of. . . ." Because such legislation constrains pub-
lic officials using public resources, framing such legislation in positive
terms does not constrain private freedom; the commands are not ad-
dressed to private persons. Congress in writing such laws bears more
resemblance to a private person directing its agents to administer its
holdings than to a ruler of private persons.
It is well established that Congress' role in regard to public lands is
that of "proprietor" rather than law-giver.244 Jaffe writes that
"[p]owers granted to manage government property could not be at-
241. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
242. 2 F. HAYEK, LAW, supra note 162, at 35-38.
243. 1 F. HAYEK, LAW, supra note 162, at 106-10.
244. See, eg., Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915).
1266 [Vol. 83:1223
Delegation Doctrine
tacked as an abdication of the 'law-making' function. ' 245 Similarly,
although article III vests the judicial power in article III courts, article
I courts may hear cases concerning public lands and other public
rights.246 Many state courts find that the delegation doctrine does not
apply to the management of public funds on the theory that such man-
agement is "proprietary." 247
A grant from Congress to the Executive Branch of control over
public property neither puts the Executive in the role of making law
nor undermines the purposes of the delegation doctrine. John Locke
envisioned the prohibition against delegation of legislative power as a
protection against being bound by laws not made by the legislature to
which one consented to be governed.248 Statutes that control public
property ordinarily affect but do not bind private persons. For exam-
ple, a decision as to the location of a federal office building may have
significant consequences for both the locale chosen and those rejected,
but the government is not binding private citizens any more than a
private corporation choosing the site for its building does.
On the other hand, the Executive might use its power over public
enterprises granted in a goals statute in order to regulate private con-
duct rather than to better the operation of a public enterprise. Such an
exercise of power over private conduct should be struck down as a
violation of the delegation doctrine. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong 249 is
a case with delegation overtones that suggests the kind of line that
needs to be drawn. There, resident aliens challenged a Civil Service
Commission rule that excluded them from federal employment. The
Commission, the Court decided, could rely upon its broad statutory
authority to set job qualifications based upon essentially job-related
purposes. However, to avoid asserted due process problems, the stat-
ute was read to deny the Commission broad discretion to set job quali-
fications for purposes that were not job related, such as favoring
citizens or influencing patterns of immigration. Although the opinion
was framed in due process terms, the distinction fits the delegation
context. The Commission may make rules for the purpose of making
public enterprises work better, but may not make rules designed to
regulate private conduct.
The regulation of private conduct gives particular urgency to judi-
245. Jaffe, supra note 8, at 376.
246. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion).
247. See Koslow, supra note 80, at 417-18.
248. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT Bk. II, § 141 (Laslett ed. 1960).
249. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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cial review and accountability as motives for the delegation doctrine.
The distinction between an exercise of official discretion over private
rights as opposed to public property seemed to make a difference to
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in National Cable Television
Association v. United States.250 He would find less of a delegation
problem in a statute that gives broad discretion to set a "fee" for use of
government property, such as the airwaves, than for the regulation of
a business that did not have special access to such government prop-
erty: "[t]he backbone of [cable television] is individual enterprise and
ingenuity, not governmental largesse. The regulatory regime placed
by Congress and the courts over [cable television] was not designed to
make entrepreneurs rich but to serve the public interest. .... -251
For Congress to manage public property through agents having
broad discretion rather than through narrowly legislated rules is not
just convenient but necessary. It is true that Congress sometimes finds
it convenient to legislate rules as to the management of public prop-
erty; it might for example outlaw the harvesting of timber in national
parks. There is nothing wrong with Congress' subjecting the manage-
ment of public property to a rules statute. Much of the management
of government property itself, however, must be under goals statutes
that grant broad discretion. Consider the example of building con-
struction. No matter how complex rules such as building codes con-
cerning the construction of private buildings become, they still do not
tell private persons what buildings they should construct. The legisla-
ture cannot deal with the myriad details involved in designing private
buildings. How then could Congress write a set of rules that would
positively tell the General Services Administration how to go about
building the many government buildings? It could not do so and,
under the delegation doctrine, it need not do so, because legislative
power refers to the governance of private conduct.
The difficulty of providing detailed legislative guidance for the
management of public lands was apparently critical in the early dele-
gation case of United States v. Grimaud.252 Congress had made it a
crime to violate regulations for the use of federal lands which the Sec-
retary of Interior (later, the Secretary of Agriculture) was to promul-
gate in furtherance of vaguely stated objectives. Grimaud violated a
regulation forbidding grazing on federal land without a permit. A di-
vided Court affirmed a lower court that had found the statute to be an
unconstitutional delegation, but the result was changed to a unani-
250. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
251. 415 U.S. at 343.
252. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
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mous reversal of the lower court on reargument after new justices,
including one familiar with the practicalities of federal land manage-
ment, were appointed.253 The Court's opinion on reargument noted in
passing that the Secretary's regulations "do not declare general rules
with reference to rights of persons and property," but did not rest on
the ground that the Secretary was managing public property.254 In-
stead, as in Field v. Clark and Hampton, the Court pretended that a
statute giving wide discretion did not in fact do so.255 Because the
Court did not rely on the special feature of public property manage-
ment, Grimaud has been cited as permitting goals statutes for the gov-
ernance of private liberty and property as if the public lands aspect of
the case made no difference.25 6 Similarly, the Court upheld the Fed-
eral Radio Commission's sweeping discretion to award broadcast ra-
dio licenses on the fictitious ground that Congress had left the
Commission to decide no more than details, without reference to the
Commission's power over the publicly owned resource of the
airwaves.
25 7
For delegation purposes a wide range of government benefits or
permissions should not be regarded as government property. At one
time, courts might have said that all government benefits or permis-
sions were "privileges" rather than "rights" and that accordingly they
gave rise to no private rights. The rights/privileges distinction has,
however, been discredited to a substantial degree.258 Professor
Charles Reich has shown that, in modern society, many so-called ben-
efits have come to have a meaning for people similar to that of real
property in earlier ages.259 Courts have responded to this "new prop-
erty" concept:26° Procedural protections now accompany many
253. See Jaffe, supra note 8, at 567.
254. 220 U.S. at 516. The Court was at this point actually comparing the Secretary's power
to that of municipal corporations over municipal affairs.
255. 220 U.S. at 516-18.
256. See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 18 (1939); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 428-29 (1935); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
257. Federal Radio Commn. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276
(1933). Even Professor Jaffe's article, which said that property management is not law making,
stated at a later point that Grimaud "confirms the delegability of the rule-making function."
Jaffe, supra note 8, at 568 (footnote omitted).
258. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
259. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
260. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970). Courts are far from having pre-
cisely defined which government benefits, jobs, or permissions give rise to this "new property."
The Court has, however, stressed that "[ilt is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbi-
trarily undermined." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). While recent cases
have been more restrained in their application of this "reliance" or "expectation" theory of prop-
1269April 1985]
Michigan Law Review
widely distributed or earned payments or privileges, ranging from enti-
tlement programs261 to drivers' licenses262 to prisoners' good-time
credits. 263 In contrast, the opportunity to get government contracts,
use public lands, or acquire a license to broadcast television signals
probably would not be treated as property. "New property" is not
protected by the takings clause, but has been treated as property for
the purposes of procedural protection under the due process clause.264
The "new property" should also be protected by the procedural pro-
tections of the delegation doctrine. Its availability should be subject to
statutory rules just as if the government were regulating any other pri-
vate liberty or property.
Professor Peter Simon summarized the Court's understanding of
the benefits which give rise to property as follows:
If. . .the legislation or regulations granting the benefit condition its
receipt upon the discretionary decision of an administrator, the expecta-
tion of the benefit is not "property." Conversely, if. . .continuing eligi-
bility for the benefit turns, by state law, upon the existence or
nonexistence of particular facts, the expectation of the benefit is four-
teenth amendment "property. 265
Translated into the nomenclature of this Article, the benefit is private
property if it is available by rule rather than by exercise of discretion.
Professor Simon argues that this is appropriate because the policy
choice as to whether benefits are to be available by rule or by discre-
tion is political, but once the legislature decides to make a benefit
available by rule, the question of procedural adequacy becomes consti-
tutional and belongs in federal courts.266 Congress, if it were provid-
ing a benefit, could decide whether it would be available by rule or
administrative discretion. But if Congress decided that a benefit
should be available by rule, Congress would, in my view of the delega-
erty, the Court has not overruled the Goldberg line of cases. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438
(1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality
opinion). Thus, it is still possible to speak in terms of "new property." In fact, with the excep-
tion of the plurality decision in Arnett, these recent cases all involved state-created benefits, rais-
ing potentially thorny federalism issues. Using Hampton to illustrate the line that needs to be
drawn, it may be said that being able to meet job-related qualifications for a federal position is
not a benefit and so is not "new property," but being eligible for federal employment is a benefit
and is "new property." See text at note 249 supra.
261. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
262. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
263. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
264. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970). See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The
New Property'" Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. RaV. 445
(1977).
265. Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 146, 153 (1983).
266. Id. at 147.
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tion doctrine, have to write the rule itself rather than delegate that
task. Congress could, on the other hand, decide to make the benefit
available on the basis of administrative discretion and authorize the
Executive to exercise that discretion without encountering delegation
problems. However, Congress is unlikely, as a political and practical
matter, to provide that such widely available benefits as Social Secur-
ity or welfare are to be made available by discretion rather than
rule.
2 6 7
C. Implications for Statutory Interpretation
Professor Gewirtz suggests that interpreting a statute to avoid a
delegation problem is a "more modest and. . preferable weapon in
the service" of the constitutional principle against delegation than
striking the statute down.268 When a statute is susceptible to two
meanings, one of which raises a delegation problem, interpreting it to
avoid the problem accords with the long-standing judicial preference
for avoiding constitutional decisions where narrower grounds are
available. This approach serves the goal of minimizing confrontation
between the courts and Congress. This statutory interpretation tactic,
however, is disingenuous when the statute is not, in fairness, open to
the narrower interpretation.
269
When Congress has plainly delegated too broadly, construing the
statute to avoid delegation problems can readily put the courts them-
selves in a legislative role. For example, in the recent American Petro-
leum case,270 Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the result, argued that
the section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act involved 271 was
unconstitutional because Congress failed to specify the degree of safety
that the enforcement agency's standards must attain.272 The agency
had taken the position that it should promulgate, in the case of carcin-
ogens, the safest standard feasible, without having to show the signifi-
cance of the risk being averted. The plurality, however, reversed the
agency by invoking the delegation concerns to justify construing the
statute to require the agency to demonstrate that its standards are
geared to the significance of the risk.273 Professor Nathanson has ar-
gued, however, that the plurality's statutory construction, geared to
267. See id. at 190-91.
268. Gewirtz, supra note 12, at 65.
269. See id. at 71-72 (contrasting the delegation doctrine and the "clear statement doctrine").
270. Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
271. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982).
272. See 448 U.S. at 676-77.
273. 448 U.S. at 639-46.
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the "significance" of the risk, leaves at least as much room for admin-
istrative discretion as the agency's reading, geared to the "feasibility"
of the standard, which the plurality found wanting.274 The plurality
did not cure the delegation problem in the statute. Rather, it arrogated
to itself a significant legislative choice, choosing "significance" of the
risk over "feasibility" of the standard.
Professor Gewirtz places his primary reliance not on construing
statutes to avoid constitutional problems, but on a related statutory
construction device: the "clear statement" doctrine.275 He would
have the courts narrow their construction of statutes that seem to al-
low agencies to make "major" policy changes unless Congress made
clear that it wished agencies to have such power.276 One advantage of
this approach, according to Professor Gewirtz, is that Congress could
reverse the judicial act by making clear that it wanted the agency to
have broad discretion. 277 This proposal has significant problems.
First, it implies that Congress is free to ignore the delegation doctrine
so long as it does so openly and expressly. This would reduce the
vesting of legislative power in the Constitution from the status of a
command to that of a suggestion. Second, the application of the
"clear statement" approach is triggered by a judicial finding that there
is a "major" policy issue at stake. This test is similar to the criterion
that has proved so vacuous and unworkable in the case of the "intelli-
gible principle" test.
Professor Gewirtz has usefully reminded us of the relevance of
statutory construction to delegation. Statutory construction, however,
cannot provide as extensive a response to the delegation problem as he
suggests if the courts are to avoid playing a legislative role in constru-
ing statutes raising delegation problems. Yet, there are aspects of stat-
utory construction which Professor Gewirtz does not discuss that
could and should be harnessed to serve delegation concerns.
This Article's theory of delegation has an important corollary for
statutory construction - that rules statutes should be interpreted on
the basis of the text of those rules read in the context of the statute's
goals and legislative history. The corollary seems unremarkable, no
more than a restatement of a standard precept of statutory interpreta-
tion. Nonetheless, the courts have deviated from this precept and
from the delegation doctrine by shifting emphasis from judicial inter-
274. See Nathanson, supra note 85, at 1070.
275. Gewirtz, supra note 12, at 65-67.
276. Id. at 66.
277. Id. at 72.
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pretation of the statute's rules to agency policy on how to pursue the
statute's goals. This deviation occurs in at least two ways.
First, modem statutory interpretation has regarded the goals of
regulatory statutes as independent grants of regulatory power, quite
apart from the substantive body of the statute. For example, Profes-
sors Gellhom and Robinson report "the recent efforts of the FTC,
with apparent judicial sanction, to expand its power to police 'unfair
or deceptive acts or practices' into a general mandate to safeguard the
American public against a wide assortment of consumer ils."278 They
state that agency power should derive only from statutes, but lament
that "[M]any commentators and all too many administrators and
courts seem to overlook this seemingly obvious point in the course of
affirming broad and protean administrative powers which go far be-
yond anything that is discernible within the creative statutes.
'279
Such power clearly affronts the purposes of the delegation doctrine. If
an agency believes that the rules stated in the text of its statute are
insufficient to achieve the statute's goals or other laudable objectives,
the constitutionally proper course for the agency is to appeal to Con-
gress to amend the statute rather than purport to find an independent
grant of power in the goals. Reference to Congress' rules is also the
proper course for the courts interpreting the statute.
Second, the courts have lost sight of legislative responsibility in too
readily deciding that legislative silence or inaction in the face of an
administrative practice outside the scope of a statute constitutes an
amendment of the statute ratifying the practice. As already noted,
280
standard doctrine holds that there is no amendment by acquiescence
because legislators ought to take affirmative responsibility for the
amendments and because legislative inaction may mean many things
other than legislative approval.
There is, admittedly, an exception to this requirement of affirma-
tive legislative action. If the agency practice has been brought home
to Congress, which then reenacts or adopts plenary amendments to
the legislation without taking action against this practice, then this
subsequent legislation can be considered to amend the statute to allow
the practice in question. 281 This qualification is understandable.
Under these circumstances, the change in law has come from action,
not inaction. Moreover, since the practice has been brought home to
278. Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 771, 776
(1975) (footnote omitted).
279. Id. at 775.
280. See text at notes 125-32 supra.
281. See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 181, at 1302-23.
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Congress, its members can be said to have taken responsibility for the
practice in voting for the new legislation.
At times, however, the courts have stretched this exception to the
point of swallowing the rule. For example, in Power Reactor Develop-
ment,282 the Court faced the question of whether the Atomic Energy
Act allowed the Atomic Energy Commission to authorize the con-
struction of a nuclear plant without first finding that it would be ade-
quately safe.283 The Commission took the position that a lower level
of scrutiny before construction sufficed so long as it took a harder look
after the plant was built. Some members of Congress in the original
debates expressed concern that investment in a plant would bias the
Commission's evaluation of the plant's safety after it was built. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, found that the statute as enacted
permitted the Commission's practice.284 Justice Douglas disagreed 285
and, in my view, provided a more convincing interpretation of the stat-
ute as enacted. The majority argued, as an alternative ground, that
whatever the Act originally meant, the failure of Congress to change
the Commission's practice amounted to ratification.2 6 They reasoned
that such a view was appropriate because the Commission's practice
had been brought home to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
which had special responsibility to oversee the Commission's work,
even though Congress had not since engaged in a plenary revision of
the Act that might have occasioned full congressional consideration of
the practice. 28 7 The majority's opinion overlooks the likelihood that
the "iron triangle" relationship between the Committee, the Commis-
sion and the industry precluded adequate ventilation of broader public
concerns.
The approach to statutory construction in a case like Power Reac-
tor Development, then, allows laws to be made without legislators hav-
ing to take responsibility for them, and so defeats one of the primary
purposes of the delegation doctrine. 288
282. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367
U.S. 396 (1961).
283. 367 U.S. at 398.
284. 367 U.S. at 406-10.
285. 367 U.S. at 419 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
286. 367 U.S. at 410-14.
287. 367 U.S. at 411-14.
288. Professor Bruff, while seeing little role for the delegation doctrine, has noted a trend in
recent Supreme Court decisions toward requiring Congress to act through statutes adopted
through the formal legislative process rather than through less formal channels. Bruf, Legisla-
tive Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REV. 207, 222-26 (1984).
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III. THE PRACTICALITY OF THE PROPOSED STANDARD
The Court has consistently stated that it should judge questions of
delegation, but, in practice, it has usually deferred to the legislative
process on delegation questions. Is there any principled basis for such
deference?
Baker v. Carr289 teaches that when the Constitution has not re-
served an issue for political resolution the judiciary should defer to the
judgment of the political branches only in limited circumstances. Two
of these may apply to delegation: (1) when there is unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision, and (2) when the ques-
tion exceeds the capacities of judicial management.290 This Part ana-
lyzes the extent to which the courts should defer to delegation by
Congress in light of these considerations. Section A asks whether a
halt to delegation of legislative power would render government un-
workable. -Section B asks whether the proposed test is judicially man-
ageable. Section C goes on to argue that delegation implicates
constitutional values of sufficient import to warrant striking down
otherwise valid statutes.
A. Can Government Work Without Delegation of Legislative Power?
Baker v. Carr would not permit the Court to turn aside delegation
concerns on the ground that the Court or Congress believes that gov-
ernment would work better with broad delegation. The Court's job is
not to decide whether broad delegation of legislative power is good
policy, but to enforce constitutional principles. As the Court said in
Chadha:
[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and use-
ful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save
it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic government
289. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
290. Specifically, the Court stated:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossi-
bility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without ex-
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. Baker v. Carr has been variously interpreted. See A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 195-97 (1962); Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doc-
trine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 622-23 (1976); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A
Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 567-84 (1966). In reviewing Baker v. Carr, Professor
Scharpf explained that political question reasoning is limited "by a normative qualification:
where important individual rights are at stake, the doctrine will not be applied." Id. at 584.
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and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that con-
gressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in
statutes which delegate authority to executive and independent
agencies. 2
91
However, the Court probably would and should turn aside delega-
tion concerns if enforcement of the doctrine would render government
unworkable. Accordingly, this Article need not try to make the case
that restricting delegation is the best or most convenient policy.
Rather it need only establish that restricting delegation as suggested
here is a policy within the realm of practicality. If that is so, the man-
date of the Constitution that Congress exercise the legislative power
itself must prevail.
Many authors have concluded that a delegation doctrine with sub-
stance is unthinkable because it would prevent government from func-
tioning.292 These arguments point to vital activities, from conducting
foreign policy 2 93 to controlling pollution 294 and regulating domestic
trucklines,295 that could not be conducted unless entities other than
Congress have decision-making power. This Article does not, how-
ever, find in the Constitution a mandate to keep all power in Congress,
only legislative power.
Accordingly, many of the classic examples of the impossibility of
government within the confines of the delegation doctrine simply are
not problems under the test proposed here. Congress could use goals
statutes to deal with public property. 296 It could also use them with
regard to war powers and foreign affairs; 297 the execution of such stat-
utes would involve the exercise of article II powers. However, Con-
gress would have to employ rules statutes in exercising its article I
powers, such as levying taxes and regulating commerce. 298 This, how-
ever, would not be so substantial a change as might first appear. Much
tax and regulatory legislation is in the rules format already.299 Recall
291. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
292. See, eg., 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 152-57; Stewart, supra note 11, at 1693-97;
Strauss, supra note 165, at 578-79.
293. See, eg., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936).
294. See, eg., 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 153.
295. See, eg., id. at 154-55.
296. See text at notes 241-67 supra.
297. See text at notes 203-38 supra.
298. See text at notes 175-202 supra.
299. The Internal Revenue Code, while not without ambiguity, is a monument to detailed
rule making. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-1564 (1982). Other examples of detailed statutes include the wind-
fall profits tax, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4986-4998 (1982), and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15
U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
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that a rules statute need not be exhaustively precise,3°° but must state
a rule of conduct, which need not always be elaborate. So, for exam-
ple, most statutes using the "just and reasonable" standard for public
utility rates would pass muster because they were enacted against a
background in which "just and reasonable" was agreed to embody the
"cost of service" concept.30 1 On the other hand, because the courts
rather than the legislature first defined the rule of conduct, statutes
that attempted to regulate a utility's profits prior to an understanding
of what "just and reasonable" meant should have been, in my opinion,
struck down. The legislature should have been required to decide
what they meant by the phrase. This hardly seems too much to ex-
pect. For example, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 contained a
general provision that railroad rates be "reasonable and just." The
courts correctly determined that Congress had not meant this lan-
guage to control a railroad's overall profits but rather to bar other
practices specifically enjoined elsewhere in the Act such as charging
more "for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line, in
the same direction," under similar circumstances. 30 2 Congress had
failed to be definite about the appropriate rule to control a railroad's
overall profits because it had not yet decided to regulate that aspect of
their operations, not because Congress was incapable of being clear. It
was not until almost two decades later that Congress decided to regu-
late railroads' overall profits,30 3 by which time "just and reasonable"
had acquired its settled "cost of service" meaning.
What of the important objectives that Congress has previously
pursued through goals statutes? In some instances, Congress could
legislate rules of conduct rather than delegate. I have argued else-
where that this would be not only possible but preferable in dealing
with such a complicated and technical problem as air pollution.
3°4
Congress could, moreover, achieve its objectives through means other
than controlling conduct directly. Judge Stephen Breyer has shown
that regulatory failure often arises from Congress choosing the wrong
legislative means to achieve its objective.30 5 He argues that less intru-
sive means generally work better.306 For instance, he would use taxes
and subsidies, rather than price controls and allocations, to deal with
300. See text at notes 179-83 supra.
301. See text at notes 189-94 supra.
302. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, §§ 1-4, 24 Stat. 379, 379-80 (1887); see W. NELSON,
THE RooTs or AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 131-32 (1982).
303. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584.
304. See Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 803-18.
305. See Breyer, supra note 191, at 550.
306. Id. at 552.
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windfall profits arising from dramatic shortages.307 Using these less
intrusive techniques, Congress could enact less complicated rules and
therefore impose a smaller burden on the legislative process.
It is argued, however, that Congress lacks the time and the exper-
tise to do other than delegate broadly.308 The legislative process is
both notoriously slow and, during the flurry of activity at the end of a
session, notoriously lacking in careful deliberation. However, neither
of these criticisms justifies broad congressional delegation by way of
goals statutes, since both can also be leveled at agencies when they
exercise legislative power in making rules. Agencies have frequently
delayed long past congressional deadlines for promulgating regula-
tions, often pleading lack of knowledge, resources, manpower and
time. Their decisions may also lack full consideration, especially given
the pressures to which they are subject.
Congress may lack the ability to generate expert information, but
this is not an argument for delegating regulation. It can request data
from agencies before legislating. This is not as politically attractive as
giving the impression of immediate action, but real action would also
be delayed, albeit not so publicly, in the agency. In some situations,
perhaps Congress should not wait for information, but should ac-
knowledge the uncertainties and make a decision on existing informa-
tion and political pressures, rather than burying the uncertainties and
political pressures in agency deliberations.
It could also be argued that a stricter delegation doctrine will sim-
ply spur Congress to find a substitute for the agencies, most likely
their own committee staffs. What, if anything, would be accomplished
by such a substitution? The most significant benefit would be congres-
sional accountability. Whatever actions committee staffs might take,
they could not, any more than the agencies, be delegated final respon-
sibility. Members of Congress would have to go on record in response
to their committee's recommendations. The record would provide a
basis on which voters could assess individual members of Congress.
Moreover, committee staffs are hired by and directly answerable to
members of Congress. Agencies are not. The public and the media
will tie staff activities much more closely to individual members and to
Congress as a whole. This fact, too, will make Congress more answer-
able than a regime allowing delegation to executive agencies.
In any event, it is not clear that Congress would have to enlarge
307. Id. at 581-82.
308. See, eg., 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 152-57. Professors Aranson, Gellhorn, and
Robinson question the basic assumption that Congress lacks such time and expertise. See Aran-
son, Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 9, at 6, 21-26.
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committee staffs substantially. Some of the past growth in committee
staffs is probably due to broad delegation, which has generated the
need on Capitol Hill to create a structure to oversee the exercise of
delegated power and to service constituents who are subjected to it.
Moreover, the President would have an interest in resisting a growth
in committee staffs at the expense of the Executive.
Administrative agencies could, and undoubtedly would, have a sig-
nificant role to play as experts in a world without overbroad delega-
tion. They would obviously interpret, implement and/or enforce the
regulations, taxes, or incentives enacted by Congress. Because of this
expertise, agencies would also usually play a key role in the enactment
of rules statutes. Congress could look to agencies instead of commit-
tee staffs to propose legislation, to provide statutory language for con-
cepts initiated in Congress, and for critiques of legislation proposed by
private parties. This approach bears some resemblance to one com-
mentator's proposal for reconciling accountability with the modem
demand for regulation:
When we think about how the Constitution might be changed to ac-
commodate the sort of large-scale, regulatory government we now seem
to need, the legislative veto isn't such a bad place to start. But we would
want a "veto" system that required Congress to vote up or down on
every major rule proposed by the bureaucracy.
30 9
This Article's proposed process resembles in many ways the pres-
ent relationship between Congress and the agencies, but there would
be critical differences. The delegation doctrine, in the form proposed
here, would not prevent Congress from pursuing important objectives,
but it could no longer mandate the achievement of laudable goals and
leave a delegate to figure out how to get there. Congress itself would
have to establish the regulations, taxes, or incentives. This means that
Congress would have to take responsibility for the costs of achieving
its objectives. Compelling responsibility is very much compatible with
the purposes of the delegation doctrine. It is also kinder to would-be
beneficiaries than goals legislation that raises hopes which no delegate
could possibly fulfill.
It is also argued that broad delegation is more efficient because an
agency can take the time to craft regulations and take account of a
multiplicity of competing goals. My analysis of the Clean Air Act
concludes that the theoretical advantages of broad delegation failed to
materialize in practice. 310 Congress took credit for promising popular
objectives, but left the hard job of allocating achievement costs and
309. Kaus, Vetoed Veto, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 8, 1983, at 10, 11 (emphasis in original).
310. See Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 789-98.
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resolving inevitable disputes to entities with less political might than
Congress. 311 The Act broke down in practice because of the difficulty
of putting the statutory scheme into operation. 312 Broad delegation
spawned a need for legislative oversight and amendment that has con-
sumed quite large amounts of legislative time over a protracted pe-
riod.313 The enactment of a goals statute did not set in motion a
political process leading to a maturation of public opinion and a con-
sensus, but rather lost the moment when public attention focused most
strongly on the air pollution issue.314 The upshot has been an ongoing
inability to resolve disputes. Congress could have made decisions
more quickly, more finally and more effectively than the administra-
tive process of the Clean Air Act 315 and with more sensitivity to vary-
ing circumstances. 316
Government without delegation of legislative power is, in my view,
not only sufficiently practical to permit the Court to enforce a strong
delegation doctrine, but also preferable. This conclusion would, how-
ever, be harder to justify in the face of some great national emergency
such as a world war or a major domestic disaster such as a widespread
plague. Professor Belknap has shown effectively that the Court has
embraced the concept of an emergency to broaden governmental pow-
ers to deal with wars but refused to apply the same concept to domes-
tic emergencies. 317 He argues that the Court should apply the
emergency concept in the domestic context as well on the theory that
an emergency exception will allow better enforcement of the Constitu-
tion when there is no emergency. 318 However, emergency powers lend
themselves to abuse. As Professor Belknap himself points out, "sup-
posedly temporary powers became a permanent feature of American
government. 319 The delegation doctrine would not, however, prevent
effective action against a domestic emergency. In a true emergency,
Congress would be willing to convene very quickly. Changes might be
made in the procedures of the two chambers to allow faster action on
proposals made by the Executive. The necessity for such a congres-
sional response might also have the salutary effect of making the decla-
rations of such emergencies less routine. There is, in my view, more
311. See id. at 762-66.
312. See id. at 748-51.
313. See id. at 798-803.
314. See id. at 818-19.
315. See id. at 812-13.
316. See id.
317. Belknap, supra note 235, at 79-84, 96-100 (1983).
318. Id. at 106-08.
319. Id. at 100.
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danger of an imagined emergency subverting the delegation doctrine
or some other important part of the Constitution than of the delega-
tion doctrine preventing an effective response to a true emergency.
Perhaps the core of some people's fear of a world without delega-
tion is a distrust of the political process and a preference for the ad-
ministrative and judicial processes that now receive delegated power.
Professor Bruce Ackerman, who expresses this preference consistently
and articulately, has a vision of reasoned, principled deliberation re-
placing the self-interested, chaotic tugging and hauling of the political
process.320 But, as Alan Watts has taught, neither the body politic nor
a natural person may overcome itself:
[T]here is really no alternative to trusting man's nature. This is not
wishful thinking or sentimentality; it is the most practical of practical
politics. For every system of mistrust and authoritarian control is also
human. The will of the would-be saint can be as corrupt as his passions,
and the intellect can be as misguided as the instincts. . . . The alterna-
tive [to faith in our own nature], as Freud saw, is the swelling of guilt "to
a magnitude that individuals can hardly support.
' 32 1
The body politic will produce legislated rules that are not of one piece
and sometimes unwise, but the same charge can be leveled at regula-
tion produced by the interaction of agencies, courts, and congressional
committees in the context of delegation. And it was the body politic
that produced our countermajoritarian Constitution, including the
first amendment and the first sentence of article I conferring legislative
power on the legislative process.
B. Is the Proposed Test Judicially Manageable?
Distinguishing between the powers of the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches is clearly difficult. The distinctions required by
the proposed test of delegation, however, are ones with which the
Court already wrestles. Specifically, constitutional adjudication al-
ready has to face the problem of defining the outer boundaries of the
President's article II powers in regard to war and foreign affairs.322
Constitutional litigation must also distinguish between government
benefits that are and are not covered by due process. 323 The only addi-
tional distinction that the proposed test of proper delegation requires
320. See Priest, Book Review, 93 YALE L.J. 1625, 1631-32 (1984).
321. A. WATTS, PSYCHOTHERAPY EAST AND WEST 121 (1975) (emphasis in original).
322. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Martin v.
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d
796 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980).




is that between "rules" and "goals." The distinction between rules
and goals is, however, one that is old and basic to law, though robbed
of its meaning in the delegation context so long as the strange gloss
that the Court put on "intelligible principle" prevails. 324
To say that the proposed test rests upon recognized distinctions
does not mean that the distinctions are already fully delineated. Judge
Skelly Wright, in urging a reinvigoration of the delegation doctrine,
disclaimed an ability to define all its contours in advance and urged
reliance on case law development. 325 This Article, I hope, lays the
foundation for sound case law development by setting forth principles
that accord with the doctrine's purposes and are more coherent and
more substantial than the interpretation now espoused by the
Court.
3 2 6
The proposed test concededly suffers from a present vagueness, but
that alone is no objection. As Professor Jaffe wrote: "nearly every
doctrine of constitutional limitation has been attacked as vague. Es-
sentially the charges go to the institution of judicial review as we have
it rather than specifically to the delegation doctrine. ' 327
Under the proposed test of delegation, no less than in constitu-
tional adjudication generally, there is a risk that members of the Court
will use constitutional doctrine as a pretext to advance their private
policy views. Still, the proposed test provides less opportunity for
such judicial intrusion into policy matters than does the current ap-
proach to delegation. This is so not just because of the unexplained
and incoherent nature of the current approach. More significantly, the
current approach to delegation allows Congress to enact open-ended
regulatory statutes under which it is all but impossible for courts to
provide meaningful judicial review without getting involved in policy
matters.32 8 Judge McGowan wrote that such broad delegations lead
to the danger of an "imperial" judiciary.329
Thus, at worst, the proposed test poses no more risk of judicial
usurpation than the current approach to delegation. The proposed
test should, with proper judicial development, be substantially more
324. See text at notes 24-36 supra.
325. See Wright, supra note 14, at 587, 593-96.
326. See text at notes 152-72 supra.
327. See Jaffe, supra note 8, at 577.
328. See Stewart, supra note 11, at 1676-88. See also text at notes 92-98 supra. I have shown
in the context of the Clean Air Act the many ways that goals statutes, unlike rules statutes, force
courts into many policy-making roles. Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 816-18.
329. McGowan, supra note 86, at 1120.
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manageable than the Court's current unintelligible, unprincipled ap-
proach to delegation.
C. Delegation and Constitutional Values
The Court has stated that judicial enforcement of the delegation
doctrine is warranted by two purposes - congressional accountability
and judicial review. These two purposes protect and separate the re-
spective powers of the various branches of government. Limiting the
delegation would also serve a third purpose - the protection of pri-
vate persons' liberty and property. These three purposes of the doc-
trine overlap, of course, and the same constellation of purposes could
be subdivided in other ways. 330 However, it is important that protec-
tion of liberty and property should be seen as an additional, distinct
purpose to emphasize that the delegation doctrine not only serves to
maintain etiquette and restraint within government, but also to protect
the people's rights. Except where protected freedoms have been recog-
nized, the Court has paid scant regard to the protection of rights as a
purpose of the delegation doctrine, at least until Chadha.
331
In Chadha, the Court insisted on a legislative process involving
both houses of Congress and the President as a safeguard against "bad
laws" and "despotism" as well as a "way to preserve freedom. '33
2
The legislative process safeguards liberty and property by its being
more cumbersome than the administrative process; the legislature
must also act on a more general basis than other branches because of
the crowded legislative agenda and because legislation that is too nar-
rowly focused may be constitutionally suspect.333 As Justice Powell
stated in his Chadha concurrence, "Congress is most accountable po-
litically when it prescribes rules of general applicability. ' 334 A statute
that states a general rule curtailing liberty or property will probably
affect many people and so require broad support to gain passage.335
An administrator, in contrast, is insulated somewhat from electoral
and other political concerns and can curb liberty or property on a
330. See Note, supra note 8, at 261-64.
331. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983). For ear-
lier recognition of this purpose, see Jacoby, supra note 86, at 906-07; Jafl'e, supra note 8, at 583,
586. See also notes 217-35 supra and accompanying text.
332. 462 U.S. at 948-49, 958-59.
333. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring);
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440-45 (1965).
334. 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring). In Chadha the Court could have invalidated
the legislative veto provision without touching all legislative vetoes by ruling that Congress was
engaging in nonlegislative activity. See 462 U.S. at 964-67 (Powell, J., concurring).
335. See F. HAYEK, LIBERTY, supra note 162, at 154-55; Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson,
supra note 9, at 65.
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case-by-case basis. As Dean Ely argued: "Much as liberals may not
like it, one reason we have broadly based representative assemblies is
to await something approaching a consensus before government
intervenes." 33
6
In short, requiring the legislative process to enact rules rather than
delegate rule-making powers to others would help to filter out govern-
mental actions that intrude on freedoms without serving the felt needs
of the public. Professors Aranson, Gellhorn and Robinson have stated
this notion in the language of welfare economics. 337 Broad delegation
cannot be explained as a means to "help legislators create public goods
and suppress public bads"338 but does make it easier for legislators to
"aid concentrated groups and fulfill their demands for private
goods. '
339
These authors draw upon a large social science literature which
presupposes that legislators seek primarily to get reelected, whether
for selfish or for altruistic purposes. 34° Legislators therefore seek at
least to appear to respond to the sometimes conflicting electoral pref-
erences of their constituency. Of particular interest here are cases
where a possible government action will benefit a concentrated, private
interest at the expense of the public generally. 341 Broad delegation can
help legislators deliver private benefits that would be difficult to deliver
directly through legislation: "[T]he members of [concentrated and
well-organized groups] understand the congressional source of their
benefits. But the rest of the electorate, which bears the net costs, re-
mains uninformed and will shift some of the blame to the agency.
' 342
Legislators can, in other words, get credit and campaign contributions
from the concentrated interest group for the private benefit delivered
through the agency, while making it appear to those who bear the cost
that the agency is to blame.
Legislators may also have a "perverse incentive" to enact cumber-
some regulatory schemes: "[T]hey can then intervene on behalf of
336. J. ELY, supra note 9, at 133-34 (footnote omitted).
337. Aranson, Gelhom & Robinson, supra note 9, at 6.
338. Id. at 6.
339. Id. at 7. These writers offer a second explanation of delegation which they call "a pub-
lic-policy 'lottery.'" IdL
340. Id. at 38.
341. An example might be the exclusion of competitors from an industry, thereby benefiting
existing firms at the expense of consumers and future competitors. Another example would be
an exemption of a particular industry from pollution controls, benefiting that industry at the
expense of environmental interests.
342. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 57. Well organized groups will con-
centrate their power and campaign contributions to get private benefits for themselves, rather
than to keep others from getting private benefits. Id. at 40.
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their constituents, providing casework, the most intensely divisible of
private political benefits. ' 343 As still another way of getting political
support or campaign contributions, "Congressmen can also threaten
adverse agency actions against 'uncooperative' constituents. Imposing
costs. . . by threatened agency action is certainly far easier than do-
ing so by statute. .... -344
The need for the legislature to act in general terms and to get wide-
spread support provides a political protection for liberty and property
that complements the judicial protection accorded under equal protec-
tion and due process.345 Discrimination or takings can often be
dressed up as properly targeted administrative regulation and the
courts in most cases must defer to the agency's judgment that the reg-
ulation is appropriate. Use of the legislative process thus furthers that
aim of our governmental structures stated by the Court in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins:
not . . . to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power. . . .For, the very idea that one man may be compelled
to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable
in any country where freedom prevails .... 346
In recognition of the safeguards offered by the legislative process,
the Court has applied a stricter test of proper delegation where it per-
ceives "personal liberties" to be at stake.347 The Court has also set out
to make the safeguards of the legislative process available by invoking
rubrics other than delegation, such as vagueness 348 and due process.
349
However, such protection has not been required when business is regu-
lated for economic, social, health, or other purposes.
No opinion for the Court has attempted to justify this differing
application of the delegation doctrine. Justice Brennan's concurrence
343. Id. at 58.
344. Id. at 58-59 (footnote omitted).
345. Professor Mashaw also sees the use of public law for private purposes as an invasion of
constitutional rights, but would deal with the problem through closer judicial review of statutes'
purposes. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TuL. L.
REv. 849, 875-76 (1980).
346. 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886). Yick Wo's language has been cited in a delegation context
by both Justice Brennan, see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 272 n.22 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), and Professor Davis, see Davis, supra note 60, at 733.
347. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 44, at 47-
48.
348. See, ag., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); United States v. L. Cohen Gro-
cery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).




in United States v. RobeP50 asserted that fundamental rights deserve a
higher degree of protection than other constitutional interests. Yet, he
did not define what distinguishes the two categories, nor is his justifi-
cation for the difference in treatment convincing. Justice Brennan ar-
gued that the statute at issue in that case was enforceable through
criminal sanction,351 but this is no different from many cases delegat-
ing business regulations where the statutes provided for criminal sanc-
tion.352 Justice Brennan also argued that the "[f]ormulation of policy
is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the elector-
ate, and to the extent Congress delegates authority under indefinite
standards, this policy-making function is passed on to other agencies,
often not answerable or responsive in the same degree to the peo-
ple."' 353 This argument is also applicable to delegations of economic
regulation.
Is there a principled way to justify the Court's more permissive
approach to delegations of power to regulate business and property?
The propriety of the Court's approach is not self-evident, even though
property has sometimes received less judicial protection than other
constitutional interests. Judge James Oakes, in a thoughtful essay on
"property rights, '354 notes the double standard under which the Court
in recent decades has deferred far more to the legislature on issues of
property than on civil rights, but he argues that property also involves
civil rights. He suggests that "we are entering a [new] phase, in which
substantive constitutional content will once again be given to property
rights. . . -355 Judge Oakes points, for example, to the "new prop-
erty" 356 of vital concern to individuals on all economic levels.357 The
lesser protection afforded to economic interests is assuredly not be-
cause property is not a right; the fifth amendment speaks of "life, lib-
erty, and property." As the Court stated in Lynch v. Household
Finance Corp.:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy
property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or
the right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right, whether the "property"
350. 389 U.S. 258, 269-82 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
351. 389 U.S. at 275-76.
352. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444-46 (1944); Currin v. Wallace, 306
U.S. 1, 7 (1939); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1936).
353. 389 U.S. at 276.
354. Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. RaV. 583
(1981).
355. Id. at 597.
356. See Reich, supra note 259, at 733. See also Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
357. Oakes, supra note 354, at 598.
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in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. In fact, a
fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty
and the personal right in property. . . . That rights in property are basic
civil rights has long been recognized.
358
Nor does the famous and increasingly criticized 359 footnote in
United States v. Carolene Products Co.360 justify the more deferential
approach to congressional delegations of power to regulate property
rather than individuals. Although a full treatment of this topic is be-
yond the scope of this Article, a few observations are in order.
Carolene Products suggested that courts, in assessing the rational basis
for legislation, should defer to the legislature's judgment to a lesser
extent when a statute may (1) violate a "specific prohibition" of the
Constitution, (2) impede the accountability of the legislative process,
or (3) work against groups isolated from the political process. In any
one of the enumerated situations, the court is supposed to scrutinize
the legislature's justification for its action to a greater extent than it
would in dealing with whether there is adequate justification for an
ordinary regulatory statute.
The second specially scrutinized classification in Carolene Prod-
ucts, which deals with legislation that undercuts legislative responsive-
ness to the electorate, supports close scrutiny of all delegation of
legislative power, although the first 361 and third3 62 classifications
358. 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
359. The critiques come from diverse perspectives. E.g., Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of
the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 703, 703-05 (1984); Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Prod-
ucts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985).
360. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
361. As to the first of the enumerated categories, "property" is the subject of a "specific
prohibition" of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV. However, the protection of
property can be said to differ from, for example, first amendment rights in that the legislature has
broad power to regulate property for public purposes; Carolene Products thus sanctions less scru-
tiny of statutes that regulate property on the theory that the Constitution lets the legislature
decide about property regulation in the first instance. This logic does not, however, sanction
deference to the legislature, if, in improperly delegating property regulation, the legislature has
sidestepped its constitutionally assigned duties.
362. The third category of special scrutiny in Carolene Products - legislation that affects
discrete and insular minorities - comes closer to explaining why delegations affecting property
receive less scrutiny than those affecting persons if the legislative process protects property inter-
ests more adequately than personal interests. This justification has serious problems. It ignores
Carolene Products' first two categories which would justify scrutiny of all delegation of legislative
power. It also overlooks the fact that property interests are deprived of the full protection of the
legislative process when the legislature legislates broadly. Moreover, legislation authorizing reg-
ulation of personal interests is not limited in its effects to discrete and insular minorities and
legislation authorizing regulation of property may well affect these minorities as well. For in-
stance, land use laws can, in regulating property, serve to exclude minorities from wealthy sub-
urbs.
In any event, it is not so easy to distinguish statutes that touch personal from those that touch
property rights. This is so, first, because of the interdependence of property, liberty, and other
rights. See note 358 supra and accompanying text. It is also so because economic regulation
affects not only the property rights of the regulated but both the personal and property interests
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might also support close scrutiny. Under the second classification,
delegation requires close scrutiny because delegation undercuts the ac-
countability of the legislation process. 363 This is no less true when
Congress delegates the regulation of concentrated, propertied inter-
ests. Such interests will sometimes support vague delegations to agen-
cies to dissipate public pressure for more specific legislative action.
364
Propertied interests may be better able than most individuals to hold
legislators accountable for the use of delegated power, but the analysis
of Professors Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson suggests that even
propertied interests will not always be able to defend themselves
against the private interests of legislators and administrators in maxi-
mizing their power. Such incapacity leads to regulatory complication
and a stifling of innovation, which hurts the powerful as well as the
weak.
To the extent that Carolene Products can be read as a statement of
those areas where the judiciary has more institutional competence
than legislatures to resolve issues, Carolene Products supports scrutiny
of delegations. The courts have had long practice in characterizing
powers as legislative or otherwise. This is an area in which Congress
has no special expertise. Congress should be held disabled from
resolving constitutional questions of delegation because members of
Congress have a conflict of interest stemming from the political advan-
tages of passing the buck.365 So the judiciary does not lack institu-
tional competence to deal with delegation issues under the test
of the beneficiaries of regulation as well. For example, air pollution legislation affects the interests
of both pollution sources and pollution victims. Courts have said that the public health and
environmental interests sought to be protected by some regulatory legislation deserve special
judicial solicitude. See, e-g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598
(D.C. Cir. 1971). Such legislation should not be vulnerable if attacked on delegation grounds by
would-be beneficiaries of regulation who have been disappointed in administrative action, but
invulnerable when attacked by a regulated business that believes an agency has used its broad
discretion to regulate its property too strictly.
363. It could be argued, however, that the electorate agrees to broad delegations when it
elects and reelects legislators that enact them. Professor Davis had indeed suggested that consent
of the electorate to delegations should bar judicial invalidations. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 8, at
150-51. Such an approach would, however, also have legitimized the legislative veto, and the
Court accepted no such argument in Chadha.
It is doubtful, in any event, that the electoral process is an effective check on legislators'
propensity and motives to delegate. Take the Clean Air Act as an example. Legislative leaders
in 1970 acknowledged that there was strong public antagonism to past legislative approaches to
air pollution which granted broad discretion to officials. See Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 819-
22. Congressional leaders promised to make the "hard choices," and passed a statute that ap-
peared to do so. Id. at 746-47. The statute was too long and complicated for voters to under-
stand that the key choices were in fact avoided; it would have taken the kind of legal analysis that
courts can perform to show that the statute lacked legally meaningful standards. Id. at 762-66.
364. See Schoenbrod, supra note 13, at 820-21.
365. See generally Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Con-
stitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).
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proposed in the Article, but does lack competence to judge conven-
ience, which is at the core of the Court's past approach to delegation.
In sum, the Court's practice of not scrutinizing most delegations is
not only contrary to what the Court says it should do but also posi-
tively harmful to important constitutional values.
CONCLUSION
The delegation doctrine is alive, but not well articulated or coher-
ently applied by the Supreme Court. The Court continues to invali-
date governmental action out of concern that Congress has delegated
decisions that should be made in the legislative process, but under ru-
brics other than delegation, such as due process or vagueness, or even
special, narrow versions of the delegation doctrine, such as a stringent
approach to cases involving certain rights or favoring statutory con-
structions that avoid constitutional clashes. Nowhere has the Court
attempted to explain how its various approaches to delegation by Con-
gress relate to one another. Thus, the Court's approach to delegation
simultaneously fails to serve the doctrine's purposes and, because it is
incoherent, invites judicial usurpation of legislative powers.
The failure by the Court is of long standing. The opinions have
opportunistically rationalized expedient results by citing empty formu-
lae rather than doing the harder work of reconciling the Constitution's
text to the pressures the Court felt in dealing with specific fact pat-
terns. In Grimaud, the Court grounded its decision on the fiction that
the statute in question had, in fact, set standards, rather than trying to
reconcile its concern that Congress cannot manage public lands with
the delegation doctrine. 366 In Panama Refining and Schechter, the
majority of the Court found it expedient to strike down statutes, but
did so by using the same meaningless test that had been used in
Grimaud to uphold an equally general statute. 367 In cases like Curtiss-
Wright and Field v. Clark the Court was moved, at least in part, by
the need for broad Executive discretion to deal with international af-
fairs but in the former created an exception to the delegation doc-
trine,368 while, in the latter, pretended as in Grimaud that an
essentially open-ended delegation had real content.369
366. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). See notes 253-56supra and accompany-
ing text.
367. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
368. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See note 33 supra
and accompanying text.
369. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). See notes 217-25 supra and accompanying text.
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This incoherent case law has tarnished the very real purposes of
the delegation doctrine and has left the Court without a coherent defi-
nition of what delegation is improper. The Court is ill equipped to
deal with future delegation questions, particularly if the membership
of the Court shifts, creating support for striking down statutes under
the empty terms of the traditional test. 370
This Article has attempted to draw the outline of a definition of
delegation that gives the doctrine substance and coherence. But it is
only an outline, not a detailed code. The concepts that I propose are
somewhat elastic and therefore risk being manipulated. That, how-
ever, is in the nature of constitutional tests. The approach presents a
lower risk of result-oriented manipulation than the Court's present
test, which is inarticulate, inconsistent, disconnected to the doctrine's
purposes, and disingenuous. As Justice Brennan put it in McGautha v.
California, "candor compels recognition that our cases regarding the
delegation by Congress of lawmaking power do not always say what
they seem to mean." 3
71
Candor also compels recognition that, in failing to do its job, the
Court has allowed Congress and the President to avoid their job of
making, in public view, the rules to govern private conduct, to the
detriment of the Constitution and those who live under it.
370. See note 39 supra.
371. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 273 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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